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The Pros and Cons o'fta^rline Alliances
by Jan K. Bnieckner and W. Tom Whalen
Abstract
This article shows that
international airline alliances have
beneficial effects that tend to offset
the negative impacts identified by
government regulators. Negative
effects arise in "gateway-to-
gateway" markets such as
Chicago-London, where alliances
raise fiires by reducing
competition. Butfixres fall in
markets like Kansas City-Munich,
which involve smaller cities located
"behind" the international
gateways. These favorable effects,
which arise in a multitude of
markets, are mostly absent in the
case ofthe proposed domestic
airline alliances, whose main effect
may be to limit competition within
the U.S.
Deregulation has spawned many innovations in
the airUne industry, including hub-and-spoke
networks and frequent flier programs. The latest
innovation sweeping the industry is international
airline alliances, which link the route networks of
two or more airlines via a cooperative arrange-
ment. In effect, an alliance allows an airline to
expand its network overseas without adding new
service. This is done through a codesharing
agreement with the alliance partner, which allows
the airline to sell tickets under its own name for
travel that occurs within both partners' networks.
Among the major alliances, the oldest are the
Northwest/KLM alliance and the Star Alliance,
which originally linked United and Lufthansa but
has expanded to include SAS, Air Canada, Thai
Airways, and Varig. A proposed alliance between
American Airlines and British Airways (AA/BA) is
still under regulatory review, and regulators are
also scrutinizing several proposed domestic
alliances within the U.S.
Alliances are controversial. The AA/BA alliance
has been in regulatory limbo for two years, with
approval held up on both sides of the Atlantic
because of concerns about the alliance's potential
anticompetitive effects. Since this controversy is
no doubt confusing to the public, some
clarification of the issues related to alliances might
be helpful. Are the regulators' concerns about
anticompetitiveness well founded? Are there
countervailing benefits to the alliances that are not
receiving enough attention? Should domestic
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alliances be viewed as equivalent to international
alliances? This article provides answers to these
questions.
To begin, consider the nearby chart, which shows
how international alliances work. For concrete-
ness, the chart depicts parts of the route networks
ofAA and BA. AA routes are shown by the
dotted lines and BA routes by the solid lines. AA
routes emanate from its Chicago-O'Hare hub,
which also serves as a "gateway" for international
traffic, and BA routes emanate from its London-
Heathrow gateway. Consider first the gateway-to-
gateway market, where Chicago residents travel to
London and vice versa. Both carriers compete in
this market before the alliance is formed, but as
alliance partners, AA and BA act like a single
airline in serving the market. The resuh is a loss
of competition, which puts upward pressure on
Chicago-London fares. Since AA and BA
together control 60 percent of U.S.-U.K. traffic
through various gateway airports, regulators fear a
significant loss of competition in gateway-to-
gateway markets due to their alliance.
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But markets like Chicago-London are not the main
focus of international alliances. Instead, alliances
are mainly intended to boost traffic in "behind-the-
gateway" markets like Kansas City-Munich, as
shown in the chart. Before any alliance, passengers
could use both AA and BA to make a
trip between Kansas City and Munich, flying on
AA to London via Chicago, and then switching to
BA to reach Munich. With an alliance, several
things are different about this trip. BA departures
to Munich are coordinated with AA arrivals in
London, reducing layover times. Also, BA and AA
gates at Heathrow are adjacent, easing the transfer.
In addition, economic theory predicts that the fare
for the Kansas City-Munich trip is cheaper when
the two airlines are allied than when they operate at
arm's length. AA would cut the amount a
passenger must pay for its part of the trip, knowing
that a high AA charge hurts BA by raising the
overall fare and reducing traffic in the market.
Since BA, keeping AA's interests in mind, would
also accept a lower payment for its part of the
Kansas City-Munich trip, the result is a lower
overall fare and higher traffic in the market. This
traffic gain more than compensates for the lower
fare, so that both carriers earn higher profit.
Therefore, in addition to the benefits fi-om schedule
coordination and gate proximity, the theory says
that passengers in behind-the-gateway markets
enjoy lower fares following an airline alliance.
This fare reduction is just the opposite of what
happens in the gateway-to-gateway market, where
the fare rises. The reason for the different
outcome is that the alliance doesn't change the
need to travel on both carriers, but it enhances
cooperation between them.
Little evidence exists on the effect of airline
alliances on fares. To see whether the fare impacts
predicted above actually occur, our research uses
comprehensive fare data from the U.S. Department
of Transportation, which collects a quarterly 10
percent sample of all tickets with a U.S. carrier
component. Using data from the third quarter of
1997, and accounting for all the existing alliances,
we find that alliances do indeed lead to lower fares
in behind-the-gateway markets. The fare charged
by alliance partners for a representative trip in
such a market is 1 8 percent lower than the fare
charged by two nonallied carriers. The data also
show that alliances lead to higher fares in the
gateway-to-gateway markets. When two of the
carriers serving such a market are alliance
partners, fares are 5 percent higher than when none
of the carriers are allied. This number can be used
to predict the fare increase in the Chicago-London
market, which currently has no alliance partners
among the four carriers providing service but
would have two following the AA/BA alliance.
The data thus reveal the pros and cons of airline
alliances: lower fares in the behind-the-gateway
markets and higher fares in the gateway-to-
gateway markets. Since there are a multitude of
behind-the-gateway markets, consumer benefits in
these markets might actually dominate the
outcome, leading to an overall consumer gain from
an alliance even without regulatory intervention.
However, regulators are properly contemplating
steps to mitigate the anticompetitive effect in the
gateway-to-gateway markets. As a condition for
approval of the AA/BA alliance, for example, EU
regulators will require both carriers to forfeit a
large number of landing slots at Heathrow, which
should allow the entry of new competitors to offset
the loss of competition from the alliance. U.S.
regulators are expected to impose similar
conditions. .
The proposed domestic alliances, which link
AA/US Airways, United/Delta, and
Northwest/Continental, involve similar issues.
However, a key difference relative to the
international case is the scope of anticompetitive
effects. While international alliance partners
compete only on gateway-to-gateway routes, the
proposed domestic partners compete more
extensively. Competition occurs in relatively few
nonstop markets, but the partners compete instead
in many markets involving small and medium-size
cities, which they serve through different hub
airports. For example, there is no nonstop
competition between AA and US Airways on
routes out of our city. Champaign, IL, but these
carriers compete in markets for travel between
Champaign and many cities in the eastern half of
the country. AA provides connecting service to
these cities via its Chicago-O'Hare hub, while US
Airways provides service through its Pittsburgh
hub. IfAA and US Airways were to act like a
single airline, fares from Champaign to many
eastern destinations would probably rise. Because
many other cities may experience similar effects,
the anticompetitive impact of domestic alliances
may be more widespread, and harder to mitigate,
than in the case of international alliances.
Regulators must bear this fact in mind in
scrutinizing the proposed alliances.
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DIRECT STUDENT AID AND COLLEGE TUITION:
ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP
by F. King Alexander
In 1997 the United States Congress established Public
Law 105-18 creating the National Commission on the
Cost of Higher Education as an independent advisory
body to analyze the issue of college costs and prices.
The eleven Commission members, including three
public and six private college officials and lobbyists,
were charged with the task of determining why college
costs are at a 30-year high and have recurrently
outpaced median household income and the cost of
consumer goods since 1980. Eleven specific factors
relating to college costs were identified and examined
by the Commission including: increases in tuition
compared with other commodities and services,
methods of reducing or stabilizing tuition, trends in
administrative costs, facility construction and
renovation, faculty productivity, and state fiscal
policies. A primary issue that received much attention
throughout the inquiry concerned the role that federal
direct student aid has played in contributing to
increases in college tuition. Despite the significance of
other factors affecting college costs, the effects of
direct student aid emerged as the most difficult for the
Commission to address.
Since the 1960s proponents of both public and private
colleges have debated whether federal and state direct
student aid policies lead to greater institutional
reliance on tuition and thereby cause an escalation of
college costs. Judging by the politically volatile
climate that has permeated discourse regarding this
issue, it is not surprising that the Commission took the
politically expedient approach and punted, finding that
the evidence was inconclusive regarding the critical
question of whether student financial aid programs have
contributed to college tuition increases. The purpose of
this paper is to present information and data that will
help clarify and better elucidate this issue.
Federal Objectives
In failing to formulate a definitive conclusion
concerning the impact of direct student
aid programs on college tuition, the Commission
advanced the presumption that the present federal
policy needs no revision and is operating appropriately.
Yet the Commission's indecisiveness leaves in doubt
whether the federal government achieved its original
objectives in adopting the direct student aid approach
when it enacted the Higher Education Act of 1965 and
the Higher Education Amendments of 1972. These
objectives were:
• To increase postsecondary educational
opportunities for lower-income students by
removing the financial barriers that limited
widespread student choice.
• To allocate federal resources to expand
postsecondary education access in a manner that
made public resources available to private
colleges and universities, thereby enabling
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public and private institutions to compete on an
equitable and fiscally neutral basis.
• To encourage states through the use of federal
resources to adopt similar funding policies
consistent with the federal direct student aid
approach.
In adopting the direct student aid approach the federal
government assumed that its objectives could be more
readily achieved than by the more traditional
institutional aid approach. Advocates of direct student
aid envisioned a vast federal system of scholarships,
loans, and other student aids that would allow lower-
income students to attend institutions of their choice
despite higher tuition costs. Colleges and universities
were given incentive to take full advantage of new
federal direct student aid by maximizing revenues
generated through student tuition and fees. Moreover,
it was assumed and asserted that increasing
competition between public and private institutions for
federal resources would enhance the efficiency of
higher education. By channeling funds to institutions
through direct student aid programs, students would be
given the economic ability to create a more
competitive marketplace forcing both public and
private institutions to operate more efficiently. In
addition to this theory of increased competition, the
Anna J. Merritt, Managing Editor
IGPA University of Illinois
1007 West Nevada Street
Urbana, IL 61801
POLICY FORUM is an occasional
publication that presents discussions and
results of recent research on important
policy issues. Manuscripts by university
as well as non-university authors are
welcome. The managing editor is
assisted by an editorial committee of
IGPA faculty. The 1998-99 committee
comprises: Jim Kuklinski, Elizabeth
Powers, Bob Resek and Carol Simon.
The University of Illinois is an
affirmative action/equal opportunity
institution.
direct student aid approach was alleged to be more
equitable because it would give private colleges and
universities access to public resources, thus making
federal aid fiscally neutral in its treatment of public and
private institutions.
When these federal programs were initiated, advocates
of public institutions expressed concern that the federal
government was rationalizing erroneous higher
education policy that would not effectively expand
educational opportunities to lower-income students and
would further create fiscal incentives to institutions to
increase tuition. Public college officials opposed these
measures fearing that by establishing a system of
grants, and especially loans, where a reported cost was
a primary determinant in the distribution formula, a
policy favoring high-cost private institutions would be
created. Further, it was also predicted by public college
proponents that low-cost public institutions that were
restricted by state policy from raising tuition would not
be permitted to respond to the tuition escalation and
would thereby have access to lesser revenues than
would private institutions. Those opposing this federal
policy feared that lower cost public colleges would be
disadvantaged as a result of this new governmental
approach. The perversity of the policy, it was argued, is
that state price controls over public college tuition
conflicted with federal incentives that fed inflation of
costs in both public and private institutions. Thus,
while state governments avowedly sought to control
costs in order to expand access, the federal government
contrarily gave fiscal incentives to raise expenditures
and costs.
Recent Incidence of Direct Student Aid
Recent information suggests that the concerns
expressed by public institution proponents three
decades ago may have been well-founded. It appears
that the market mechanisms invoked by federal, and
subsequently, state direct student aid policies, have had
the contradictory effects of increasing competition
while driving up costs at the same time. The result has
been an inversion of what economists normally expect
from competitive models. The various forces associated
with this phenomenon have resulted in two
developments. First, student costs have substantially
increased since 1980 at both public and private
institutions. At most public institutions, tuition
increases during the 1980s and early 1990s were used
as a means of stabilizing per student educational
expenditures to offset recurrent declines in state
appropriations. At private institutions, tuition increases
during the same period were used by many institutions
to increase per student educational expenditures to
enhance their competitive advantage in the higher
education marketplace. Second, despite tuition
increases by both public and private sector institutions
during the last two decades, cost differences, in
reported pricing between public and private
institutions, continue to increase. Because of these
substantial cost variations between public and private
institutions, those attending private colleges are
awarded greater amounts of federal appropriations per
recipient in grants and subsidized loans than students
who choose to attend public campuses. In fact,
according to the College Board and the National
Center for Education Statistics, of the over $6 billion
in federal student grant program assistance in 1995-96,
35 percent went to private college students. When
comparing four-year public and private institutions,
private college students received cumulative individual
federal grant awards averaging $2,824 per student
more than do students attending public colleges. It is
also important to note that 61 percent of private
college students qualify for federal grant awards, while
only 41 percent of public college students qualify.
In analyzing federally supported loan programs,
similar results are found. Of the approximately $34
billion in federally supported loan funds allocated to
higher education students in 1995-96, private
institution students receive over 60 percent of the
aggregate resources. These percentages are
particularly striking considering that private
institutions only enroll 24 percent of the full-time
student population in higher education. Moreover,
according to data provided in the American Freshman
Survey, private institutions currently enroll fewer
lower-income students as a percentage of their entering
freshman class than were enrolled in the mid-1970s.
Private colleges also enroll fewer lower-income
students as a percentage of their entering class than do
public institutions. Thus, the federal direct student aid
policies developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
have been far more beneficial to private and other
institutions than public institutions while lower-
income students remain primarily relegated to lower
cost public institutions.
Federal Influence on State Policy
One of the most significant developments that emerged
as a result of the federal government's adoption of
direct student aid was the immense influence that this
policy approach had on state higher education policy.
Prior to the passage of the Higher Education Act of
1965, only five states had experimented with the
distribution of public funds through direct student aid
programs. Most state constitutions prohibited
appropriations of public moneys to non-public
institutions. During the early 1970s two important
events changed the way the majority of states viewed
direct student aid. In 1971 the U. S. Supreme Court's
decision in Tilton v. Richardson upheld the Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963 allowing public money
to flow to religiously controlled colleges for the
construction of educational facilities. One year later
Congress passed the Higher Education Amendments of
1972 establishing the State Student Incentive Grants
Program (SSIG), which became fully operational in
1974. The primary purpose for creating the SSIG
program was to provide matching federal resources to
entice states to establish and expand direct student aid
policies similar to that of the federal government. This
was an important policy initiative by the federal
government during a period when most states refused to
allow public resources to be appropriated for use by
private institutions. Such denials by states were based
on the twofold issue of public accountability and
constitutionality. At that time, most state constitutional
provisions were given strict interpretations regarding
the allocation of tax funds to non-public entities, and
most state court precedents adhered to the principle of
separation of church and state.
In the aftermath of Wton and the enactment of SSIG,
states began to follow the federal precedents in
permitting aid to private institutions. Within five years
after the Supreme Court ruling and four years after the
creation of the SSIG program, thirty-nine states had
either reversed existing restrictions on aid to religious
and privately incorporated institutions or had increased
funding to direct student aid programs. Today, nearly
every state appropriates some public resources to over
217 different direct student aid programs constituting
over $3 billion in financial assistance to sttidents.
state Direct Student Aid Growth
During the last two decades states increasingly turned
to direct student aid as a preferred funding alternative
to the more traditional institutional and formula-based
funding methods. From 1976 to 1997, state allocations
to direct student aid programs grew from 4.8 percent to
6.6 percent of all state appropriations to higher
education. In this period, state allocations to direct
student aid programs grew from approximately
$500,000 to over $3 billion. This increase indicates
that states were willing to follow the federal
government's fiscal policy incentives to expand direct
student aid programs.
In a number of states spending on direct student aid
programs, as a percentage of state appropriations, is
considerably higher than the national average of 6.6
percent. In New York and Vermont, where there is a
long history of providing grants to students attending
private institutions, grant program funds constitute
over 20 percent of state appropriations to higher
education. In Illinois and Pennsylvania, states with
unusually large numbers of politically influential
private colleges and universities, state allocations to
direct student aid programs constitute over 14 percent
of all state appropriations for higher education. Thus
direct student aid has become a major and growing
methodology for the channeling of public tax funds to
private institutions in many states.
Much like the federal programs, distinctions between
public and private institutions are rare in most state
student aid programs with one important exception;
cost differences are almost always factored into direct
student aid giving private, higher cost institutions,
formulaic advantages. Most state direct student aid
programs are designed to provide more funds to those
institutions that have higher expenditures and costs.
Because private colleges and universities generally
have more financially enriched programs, they tend to
receive greater per student and per award proportions
of state funds. According to NASSGAP, students
attending public institutions receive only 63 percent of
the dollar awards received by students attending
private institutions in state student aid programs. When
comparing aggregate amounts of state direct student
grants, students attending private institutions received
over 45 percent of all grant dollars expended in these
programs even though they only sustained enrollments
of 24 percent of the full-time student population.
This kind of disparity is present in most states and such
differences have persisted since the inception of these
programs. In some cases, states have exacerbated these
differences by creating or expanding grants sometimes
ironically labeled as "tuition equalization programs."
Such grant programs tend to reward the highest
expenditure institutions with the largest awards. They
also provide economic incentives for all institutions to
increase tuitions and to force students and families to
bear greater proportions of college costs.
Direct Student Aid in Illinois
Illinois ranks fifth in the nation behind California, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio in the number of private
colleges and universities. Over 65 percent of the Illinois
institutions are private, enrolling approximately 26
percent of the student population. As a result of the
demographic and political dynamics of having a
powerful private higher education lobby, Illinois has
the nation's third oldest direct student aid program in
the nation.
In 1997 Illinois allocated nearly $300 million in public
tax dollars in direct student aid for those attending
public and private institutions within the state. The
largest program, the Illinois Monetary Assistance
Program (MAP) created in 1958, is the nation's second
largest state direct student aid program and is projected
to grow to over $310 million by 1999. Currently, this
program is over 30 percent larger than Georgia's
nationally recognized HOPE Scholarship program. Like
many other state direct student grant programs, MAP
was devised as a tuition equalization program that was
justified on the theory that it would promote student
choice and address the needs of lower-income students.
The principle of vertical equity is often used by the
Illinois Student Assistance Commission (ISAC) as the
primary reason justifying the need for increased
funding to the Monetary Assistance Program. Vertical
equity recognizes that students are different and seeks
to provide more money to those with the greatest need.
Not unlike most state direct student aid programs,
Illinois' MAP also uses the cost of attendance as a
variable in determining financial need. As a result.
students choosing to attend institutions in Illinois with
substantially higher student costs receive considerably
higher individual awards. For example, dependent and
independent students enrolling in private four-year
colleges received $833 more than students attending
public four-year universities and an average of $2,441
more than students attending community colleges in
1996-97. Private institutions received 48 percent of all
MAP resources despite enrolling only 30 percent of
the total award recipients in 1997.
The MAP funding formula not only advantages
students attending higher cost private colleges in
Illinois but it also allows students from higher income
families to qualify for larger awards. The average
mean income of parents of dependent students in four-
year private institutions receiving MAP awards in
1997 was over $1 1,000 higher than the mean parental
incomes of award recipients in public four-year
universities, and $16,000 higher than the mean income
of parents of award recipients enrolled in community
colleges. For example, the average parental income of
dependent students receiving MAP awards that
attended Wheaton College in 1997 was $42,137,
$16,474 higher than the average parental income of
students receiving MAP awards at University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, $19,5 16 higher than the
average parental income of students receiving MAP
awards at Southern Illinois University, and $30,175
higher than the average parental income of students
receiving MAP awards at Harold Washington College.
Due to substantial cost variations in the price of
attendance, wealthier students receive larger awards
because they choose to attend higher cost private
colleges and universities in Illinois. This practice
actually violates the principle of vertical equity rather
than enhancing it. The conclusion that must be drawn
is that students with greater incomes are rewarded with
larger awards than those with lesser incomes, the
reverse of vertical equity.
The Effectiveness of Direct Student Aid
Ascertaining the effectiveness of these governmental
programs depends on the identification of the
particular objective(s) of the policies. If the
fundamental objectives of federal and state direct
student aid policies were to expand student choice,
thus allowing greater numbers of lower-income
students more educational opportunity to attend private
colleges, then the programs have been a failure. Today,
private institutions enroll fewer lower-income students
as a percentage of their entering class than they did two
decades ago. Public institutions, however, especially
public two-year colleges, continue increasingly to
enroll a higher percentage of lower-income students as
a percentage of the entering class. If the primary
objectives of governmental ly supported direct student
aid programs were to move all colleges and universities
to the high tuition-high aid funding scheme, then the
achievement of this end was also a failure. Most state
legislatures driven by overwhelming public demands to
limit tuition increases at public institutions have made
it virtually impossible for the majority of public
institutions to charge students the market cost of higher
education. If the policies were devised to expand higher
education enrollments by invoking consumer-based
market mechanisms that treated public and private
institutions in a fiscally neutral manner, then the
programs at the federal and state levels are also failures
because they substantially advantage higher cost private
colleges.
The most important point to be gleaned from these data,
including the Illinois MAP awards, is that the more the
institution charges in student tuition and fees the more
the direct student aid programs will pay. Even though
maximum amounts are established, there is nevertheless
a strong escalation effect. To maintain that direct
student aid programs have no impact on college tuition
is to ignore the basic economic principle that prices in
such a market will respond to an indiscriminate influx
of capital.
Prospects for Policy Reform
Without attributing motives, one is naturally led to
suspect that a Commission dominated by private
institution membership was not eagerly seeking to
criticize a method of funding that yielded results so
highly favorable to their institutions. The Commission
should have faced the reality of the conflict of purposes
that so readily appear between federal and state direct
student aid policies and other state institutionally-based
funding policies in the treatment of tuition. Because of
differences in philosophical rationale for aiding higher
education, many state governments recurrently adopt
conflicting policies regarding college costs making it
virtually impossible for public institutions to take full
advantage of the economic incentives provided
primarily by federally supported student loans and
state student grants. When it failed to reach a
conclusion regarding this issue and did not recommend
less inflationary measures, the Commission missed a
unique opportunity to make a major contribution to
higher education and taxpayers. Possible alternatives
include:
• Establishing a reasonable foundation level for
both funding of public and private institutions
based on actual quantifiable cost of educational
services. The foundation level could provide
student awards based on student needs and
actual educational costs with less consideration
of the cost of attendance. This would make the
objective of vertical equity a much more
attainable goal while reflecting more of the
formulaic considerations used in determining
Pell Grant awards.
• Leveling the playing field for institutions facing
public tuition restrictions by recommending
that cost controls must also apply to private
institutions that seek to benefit from the public
resources allocated to these kinds of programs.
• Rewarding institutions directly for meeting
federal student enrollment objectives. In view
of the fact that lower-income students
increasingly encounter college cost barriers
relegating them to the lowest cost institutions,
the Commission could have recommended a
system that rewards institutions directly for
enrolling increasing percentages of lower-
income students. Such an approach could
borrow from Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, a successful
program for students from lower-income
families attending elementary and secondary
schools.
There is some comfort in knowing that the
Commission's ambiguous conclusion regarding this
critical policy question will not be the final word in the
matter. As college costs and direct student aid program
budgets continue to increase, disparities favoring
higher cost institutions will also continue to expand,
placing greater pressure on policy makers to scrutinize
the direct student aid program objectives to determine
how these policies may adversely impact the higher
education marketplace.
F. King Alexander is an affiliate of IGPA and an
assistant professor of higher education in the
College of Education at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
SS9-3W
/:jejqT"l Qt'S
>|jsTa suoTT.BOTxqnd in
I08I9 ll'BUBqJl
;33J)S BPBA3M |S3yW LOO
siouiiil JO ^isJaAiuf
SJiBUV 3Hq"d P"^ juamujaAO^ jo ajnjijsu
lUnJOj Jioi\Ot
jsdEd papXoaa uo paiotJ
University of Illinois
THE LibHAHr vr I HE
i^^[1[^j^[q of Government and Public Affairs
olicv Jrorurn
353.9773
P758
12:3 Pf:R!P'^''^a!
Copy 4
EDX
Volume 12, Number 3, 1999
Putting a Value oh Prairies and Wetlands
The Economic Case for Recovering Natural Areas in tlie Cliicago Region
by Richard Kosobud
Nowhere is the influence of humans on
their environment more obvious than in met-
ropolitan areas like Chicago. In these places,
population growth and technology have led
to the development of nearly every useable
piece of land for the production of market-
able goods and services. But, does this
spread of population, often called urban
sprawl, satisfy the public's preference for
open and natural space?
Because the benefits of open spaces are
public goods and are not marketable like
other land uses, the marketplace has failed
to provide enough of them. Government
policies have also overlooked the adequate
provision of open spaces.
The failure of the market and local gov-
ernments to provide for natural open spaces
does not mean this public good is without
value. A survey of Chicago area residents
found them willing to pay an average of ap-
proximately $20 a year in increased taxes to
recover and maintain natural open spaces.
Findings
Chicago's urban sprawl and the intensive
agricultural practices in the farm belt sur-
rounding it have left only remnants of the na-
tive prairie grasses and flowers, woodlands,
oak savannas and large stretches of wet-
lands that once characterized the area.
Tax advantages, subsidies and expressway
construction encourage low-density develop-
ment. However well intentioned, such tilting
has worked against natural areas. Local gov-
ernment policies, occupied with obtaining
revenues from development, overlook the
benefits of open spaces. These limitations of
the market and government have led to an
unsatisfied public preference for more natu-
ral open space.
A survey to determine how much the pub-
lic is willing to pay for more open space
found that the Chicago area residents, on av-
erage, were willing to pay about $20 a year
per household in additional local taxes to ob-
tain more natural settings in the region.
This could yield up to $50 million per year
for the region for the creation, recovery, and
maintenance of areas that would add to the
well-being of residents.
Balancing the cost of creating more open
spaces against what people are willing to pay
for these spaces, as revealed by the survey,
leads to the finding that, in the first year, up
to 5,000 acres (one acre equals a football
field) of new space could be carved out of, or
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recovered from the region. Since each
acre requires maintenance, it is not pos-
sible to add 5,000 acres each year. Rather,
annual spending goes increasingly to main-
tenance of continued growth so that, in the
end, with this revenue stream, some
25,000 acres of new natural areas could be
added to the region's stock. This would be
an increase of a little more than 10 percent
of existing spaces of a similar nature.
The Chicago Region's Deconcentration
Private decisions affecting 3,800 square
miles of land are being made by approxi-
mately three million households, thou-
sands of private enterprises, and hundreds
of not-for-profit institutions in the Chicago
region. The metropolitan area contains
close to 300 different municipalities and
more than 1,000 taxing districts. Many of
these bodies play important roles in deter-
mining land use through direct ownership,
zoning ordinances, building codes, direct
regulation, land use plans and transporta-
tion designs. In many ways this is a re-
markable decentralized system of markets
and governments that can give play to a
wide range of individual preferences.
But important questions can be raised
about the ability of this system to fully
serve the welfare of its residents with re-
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spect to land use. Externalities, or
spillovers, from market activities that af-
fect individual wel-
fare and business i^^m^m^h^^hm^hi
operations, but are
not reflected in u
prices, can deflect Markets
the region from its
^^^ fail tO
potental. Ex-
, ,.
amples include ur- provide public
ban land uses that gOOds like
harm the water natural areas
cycles of ecosys- Upraime no one
terns, limit habitat
oec us
for species, and im- can realize
pose pollution on gains from
unAAdUing victims.
^j^^jj. provision,
and not all of
these impacts
are addressed
by effective
public policies."
Spillovers arising
from government
actions can also
lead to welfare
losses. Examples
include zoning for
development up-
stream of wetlands ^^^^^^^^^g^^^^^
or not providing an
adequate amount or
range of public
goods and services, including natural areas.
Markets can fail to provide public goods
like natural areas because no one can real-
ize gains from their provision, and not all of
these impacts are addressed by effective
public policies. That is, botii market and
government failures have a bearing on
natural areas and related biodiversity.
It must be stated clearly at tiie outset
that the test is whether correcting Uiese
market or government failures could lead
to a more efficient allocation of land to
competing uses that would satisfy better
the public's preferences. Note tiiat it is
tiie individual member of tiie public whose
preferences are important for tiiis purpose.
These preferences lead to valuations of
both public and private goods and services.
These valuations enable tiie attachment of
monetary amounts to open spaces so tiiat
open spaces can be compared to other
uses of public and private money. The in-
trinsic value of biodiversity is not being
measured, but the individual's valuations of
them. This approach is not always in line
with the views of biologists and ecologists
who may prefer searching for intrinsic val-
ues. But intrinsic values have proved very
to quantify monetarily.
Consequences of Deconcentration
What is happening to the Chicago area
appears to be happening in a general way
to other metropolitan areas as well. City
density declines as one travels to the city
edge. This relationship shifts over time re-
flecting urban deconcentration as city cen-
ter density decreases and outlying places
are built-up. This shift is happening in
many other metropolitan areas, but with
important variations. For example, Euro-
pean cities tend to be more densely settled
than cities in the U.S.
While this shift may be attributed to
higher incomes, increased education, and
changes in transportation and information
technologies, these patterns are not an eco-
nomic law but a reflection of the many ben-
efits and costs of locational decisions, both
residential and nonresidential. They can
change as benefits and costs change. Stud-
ies that emphasize only the costs of urban
sprawl - or only the benefits - may miss im-
portant underlying regulations, decisions
and patterns that affect the use of land for
residential and other purposes.
Are the private and public benefits and
costs of urban deconcentration, especially as
they concern wilderness areas, fully and
fairly reflected in contemporary market and
government decisions on the use of land?
The answer is, subject to many qualifications
and caveats about the adequacy of data, that
they are not. The implication, in economic
terms, for natural areas is that there are inef-
ficiencies in the present sprawl pattern. The
correction of these inefficiencies could im-
prove the general welfare.
Among these market inefficiencies is that
the social costs of low-density de-
velopment, defined as 3 dwelling
units per acre or less, are not
fully borne by the occupants. The cost of
infrastructure like
streets and lights
and that of services ^^m^m^^^^^mm^
like police and utili-
ties are shared **
monetflrv
among all residents
"* ^
of a community, cOStS paid by
rather than as-
automobile
signed to the spe-
cific development. Owners are
Another leading estimated tO be
cause is provided by
^ fraction, say
three-quarters,
of their true
burden."
a federal tax code
that subsidizes
homeownership
costs to an extent
far greater than the ^m^^^^t^^mm^m^m
subsidies provided
for public housing
and rental assistance in the center city. As
a consequence, the building fields are tilted
toward low-density development that can
be destructive of natural areas. These sub-
sidies have been estimated to range up to
$2,000 per unit, and sometimes higher, in
regions like Chicago's.
Additionally, the monetary costs paid by
automobile owners are estimated to be a
fraction, say three-quarters, of tiieir true
burden. This is due to subsidies for roads,
parking, and accident costs, among others.
If public or nonmonetary factors are added
in—for water pollution and flood control,
air quality impacts, opportunity costs of
land used for roads—motor vehicle users
paid an even smaller fraction of the total
costs. None of this includes tiie value of
time lost in congestion. Since residents of
fringe areas often have long commutes,
this subsidy also encourages low density
development.
The powerful tools of local governments
over land use, ranging from zoning ordi-
nances to building codes, can and often do
favor land uses that further urban
deconcentration and fail to provide suffi-
cient open space and wilderness areas to
meet tiie general demand. Furthermore, a
local government's jurisdiction and tax
base rarely encompasses all the beneficia-
ries, which makes it difficult to provide the
optimum amount of wilderness areas.
There are benefits, both private and pub-
lic, to urban deconcentration that must be
examined if we are to understand the rea-
sons for this pattern in most major metro-
politan areas. Among them are flexibility
from the use of the car in shopping, com-
muting and recreation, the increased range
of choice of public goods and services avail-
able from numerous local governments,
and the apparently strongly held prefer-
ences for a lower density life-style. The
consequence is that, even if all private ben-
efits and costs of land-use choices were
fully allocated to the appropriate individu-
als, all public benefits and costs properly
internalized, and these changes reflected
in new market prices and government tax
rates, many people would, in all probability,
still opt for lower density living. That is,
urban deconcentration would continue to a
significant extent.
Yet, based on the analysis presented here,
the expansion of the urban area and the loss
of natural areas have been excessive, in rela-
tion to individuals' preferences, and will con-
tinue to be excessive unless some policies
are changed. For example, policies could be
modified to correct current distortions in
the effective prices of various development
densities and transportation modes to more
accurately reflect that density's or mode's
cost. Another more direct and perhaps more
manageable approach would be simply to
provide more for such areas in local and
state government budgets and policies, and
enhanced private contributions.
Such changes would depend ultimately
upon the public's preferences for allocating
scarce resources to wilderness area recov-
ery and extension, and upon the costs for re-
covery and expansion efforts. As mentioned,
to help answer questions in these areas, this
study carried out a sample survey of public
preferences in the region and collected re-
covery and improvement cost data from a
number of regional sources.
Survey of Preferences for Natural Spaces
The sample for this study was not drawn
from the regional population, but was se-
lected to represent a wide variation in key
variables such as income and education.
Interviews were arranged with middle-in-
come respondents at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. Interviews were ar-
ranged in the Pilsen neighborhood with
the help of school and local officials. This
is primarily a low-income area with little
natural space. Interviews were arranged in
several suburbs like Evanston by selecting
a few blocks to canvass. Finally, interviews
were arranged with undergraduates and
graduate students. Variation in key vari-
ables was close to the variation for the re-
gional population.
All respondents were shown a brochure
with pictures of natural space. They were
given background data on natural and open
space now available in the region. They
were also reminded that what they were
willing to pay meant a decrease in other
expenditures they
would like to make.
The question was ^^^^^^^"^^^^'^
asked in a referen- u
dum style as if an The survey
increased tax pay-
^^ 2OO residents
ment were to 11-
nance the space. revealed a
The sample results significant
were than adjusted willingness tO
statistically for the r
^,„
general population. P^Y ^r new
The survey of 200 wilderness
residents revealed a recovery and
significant willing- extension
ness to pay for new . . . „
wilderness recov- activities.
ery and extension ^^i^^^^^m^m^^
activities. The
mean adjusted for the nonrandom sample
was a little less than $20, with sampling er-
ror of about 10 percent. Applied to the
close to 3 million households of the region,
this estimate indicates that close to $50
million dollars per year could become avail-
able for land acquisition, soil preparation,
weeding, seeding, maintenance and other
measures.
The amount respondents were willing to
pay increased with income and education.
That indicates that wilderness recovery
has some of the characteristics of a "supe-
rior" good. The amount respondents were
willing to pay decreased with the age of
the respondent. These results, while new
for wilderness projects in the region, are
consistent with other studies. When asked
if a further increase would be supported
several years later for additional activities,
the respondents were on the average fa-
vorably inclined, but at a reduced level of
support, as one might expect if respon-
dents were thinking seriously about the
question and about the alternate uses of
their money.
Review of Creation and Recoveiy Costs
To satisfy this demand for natural areas
requires supplying costly resources. The ex-
tent of recovery or improvement that could
be achieved would depend in part on how
high the costs were for improvement per
acre, and the rise in costs as efforts contin-
ued. Data collected from a number of sites
and sources yielded a wide range of esti-
mates that varied according to the objec-
tives of the managers and the initial condi-
tions of the site. Cost per acre can be
quite large at the beginning of an opera-
tion, a reasonable range being $3,500 to
$22,500, when soil movement, grading,
seeding, weeding, and stimulation of
growth are required. Wetlands are more
expensive to restore or create than prai-
ries. Spending per acre declines apprecia-
bly as the size of the wilderness site in-
creases. Costs also decline appreciably as
the site reaches stability and only mainte-
nance is needed.
Balancing preferences and costs shows,
first, that an expansion and improvement of
the region's wil-
derness space
over present ef- ^^^^^a^^i^m^^i^
forts in this direc-
tion is support-
'j^g gj^^
able in strictly
economic terms. result... is that
Second, and more 25,000 acres
eventually could
be added..."
concretely, about
5,000 additional
acres in the initial
year could be
added to existing ^^'^"^"'^^^"
native areas. As
maintenance
spending to assure vigorous and continuing
growth is essential, the annual addition of
new acres would decline as the proportion
of the annual revenue stream spent on
maintenance increases. The end result of
this decline is that 25,000 acres eventually
could be added to the region's existing
stock, or an increase of a little over ten per-
cent. These new natural spaces would be
an increase over presently planned efforts
of this nature, and would represent an addi-
tion to the present stock of indigenous
biodiversity. It would mean an increase in
the annual stream of human-valued "ser-
vices" emanating from that stock, adding to
our welfare, and to the welfare of future
generations.
Richard F. Kosobud is professor of
economics at the University ofIllinois at
Chicago where he teaches and carries out
research in the area ofenvironmental and
natural resource economics. His latest book is
Emissions Trading: Rnvironmental PoHcv's
Np.w Approach to be published by John Wiley
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The Rising Hegemony of Mass Opinion
How public opinion came to rule the American political system
By Paul J. Quirk
and Joseph Hinchliffe
The Founding Fathers warned about the dangers of an
"excess of democracy" and designed the Constitution
in large part with a view toward preventing it. Judging
from most commentary on American politics, with
respect to most of the intervening two hundred years,
they needn't have worried: The mass public has only
occasionally been a dominant force in national policy
making. Elites, although often responding to broad
public concerns, have usually defined the specific
directions of policy change.
Indeed, by most accounts, the principal weakness
of the American political system has been just the
opposite: a tendency toward domination by organized
interest groups, busi-
ness, and the privileged
classes. Few commenta-
tors on American politics
have echoed the
Founders' fears about
demagogues and unruly
mobs. Indeed, most have
heartily approved of
mass political move-
ments—from Populism and Progressivism to the civil
rights movement, Vietnam War resistance, consumer-
ism, environmentalism, and feminism.
In recent years, however, appreciation of the
Founders' concerns about mass politics has been on
the increase. Scholars have written critically about the
rise of a "plebiscitary presidency," thoroughly depen-
dent upon immediate public approval, and the increas-
ing tendency for presidents to exercise leadership
largely through direct appeals for public support.
An expanded version
of this article, with
case studies, is
available at the
IGPA web site:
www.uillinois .edu
Some have argued that Congress cannot legislate
effectively because of the extreme openness of its
decision processes and the relentless efforts of its
members to please the voters. Others have criticized
the dramatic growth of policy making by initiative and
referendum—forms of direct democracy—in many
states.
The hazards of overly direct and compelling mass
influence seem apparent in a variety of major policy
developments of the past two decades. These include
the large budget deficits of the 1980s and 1990s,
especially the difficulty of achieving either tax in-
creases or reductions in middle-class entitlement
programs to reduce the deficit; the huge costs and
limited benefits of some regulations concerning
health, safety, and environmental protection; the
failure of the United States in the early 1990s to offer
substantial economic aid to support the transition to
democracy in Russia; the emphasis on demonstrably
unsuccessful interdiction and law-enforcement strate-
gies, rather than prevention and treatment, for dealing
with drug abuse; and a reform of the welfare system
that overlooked serious issues of workability and
potential harm. In all these cases, we believe, unin-
formed prejudices of the mass public and leaders'
appeals to those prejudices played a critical role in
shaping policy.
In the late twentieth century mass opinion has
emerged as a hegemonic political force, the dominant
influence in policy making. To a great extent, the
relative availability of effective popular rhetoric to
support various positions has become the main
determinant of policy outcomes. Other forces, such as
expert opinion and interest-group demands, remain
important, and sometimes determine outcomes, but
generally they play a smaller role than in the past. To
Visit thie IGPA web site at: www.lgpa.uillinois.edu
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account for the expanded influence of mass opinion,
we point to very broad changes, first noticeable in the
1960s, in how citizens connect with the political
world—that is, in the kinds of information they receive
and how they use it. In brief, more citizens are making
judgments on more policy issues and using those
judgments more often in their political decisions,
including their choices of parties and candidates.
The effects of this change in the nature of mass
politics began to emerge in the politics of policy
making in the 1970s. Examples of this change cover a
wide range of subject matter—from environmental
regulation to Social Security, and from energy pricing
to taxes and the budget, among others. In various
ways, they all represent new landmarks for the influ-
ence of mass opinion.
The cases also suggest that rising mass influence
cuts two ways with respect to the performance of
government. On the one hand, it can help to overcome
the organized interest groups and other narrow forces
that have often dominated American politics. On the
other hand, with the increased risks of demagoguery
and greater deference to even biased or uninformed
public opinion, an increasingly powerful mass opinion
also can lead to policies that are reckless, irrespon-
sible, or ill-suited to their purposes.
Institutions, Ideology, and Information
Some scholars have attributed populist tendencies
in policy making to the rise of a participatory, anti-
authoritarian ideology in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Some suggest this mood was an instance of the
"creedal passion," or renewed and intensified commit-
ment to the nation's democratic values, that appears
cyclically in American history. And it produced a
"crisis of governability"—with the public's demands
leading to an explosion of costly or impractical benefits
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and claimed rights along with the consistent budget
deficits of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Others say a
participatory, anticapitalist ideology influenced by the
New Left led to the development of the "public-lobby
regime" of the 1970s.
From a more recent ^^^HMHaa^^^^HHi^MHi
perspective, however, an
ideological account of 64
rising mass influence
largely fails. It cannot protections
'...institutional
against
democratic
excess have
eroded over the
course of
American
history and
especially in
recent decades."
explain why the enhanced
influence of mass opinion
has survived the shift
toward conservatism that
began in the late 1970s
and has endured into the
mid-1990s. The demo-
cratic creedal passion and
post materialist participa-
tory values of the 1970s
have subsided, but
plebiscitary policymaking
has not.
Another group of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
scholars stresses the role
of political institutions in determining the influence of
mass opinion. In this view, the danger of "democratic
excess" is an essential feature of representative
government. To avoid unjust or destructive policies,
representative government must subdue the effect of
public opinion. It may do so through institutional
arrangements such as indirect election, lengthy and
varying terms of office, checks and balances, and
restrictions on publicity.
Unfortunately, in these commentators' view,
institutional protections against democratic excess
have eroded over the course of American history and
especially in recent decades. Indirect election has been
eliminated for senators, formally, and for presidents, as
a practical matter. Beginning with Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson, presidents have abandoned a
nineteenth-century norm that prohibited their appeal-
ing to the public to seek support for specific policies.
In the 1970s, Congress made several changes in rules
and procedure, such as permitting television coverage
of floor proceedings, which have undermined its ability
to resist public pressure and deliberate independently.
But this account has problems too. It does not explain
why we find an apparent rise in mass influence by the
early 1970s, prior to the main institutional changes of
the decade, or why those institutional changes them-
selves were adopted.
In contrast, we do not trace the increase in mass
influence to ideology, political attitudes, or institutional
structures. Our primary focus, rather, is on broad
changes in how citizens use information and make
judgments about politics.
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Competing Forces in Policy Malting
Fundamentally, we may consider that policymakers
weigh the preferences or recommendations of three
main categories of actors; special-interest groups,
policy experts oriented toward broad interests, and
ordinary citizens or public opinion. Roughly speaking,
policy experts (as here defined) and public opinion are
concerned with the same widely shared interests. But
they define those interests differentiy Experts define
them, somewhat autonomously, on the basis of careful
reasoning and specialized knowledge. The public
defines its interests more casually, using whatever
beliefs, hunches, or prejudices it happens to have. To a
considerable extent, as researchers have shown,
citizens take their cues fi-om political leaders. But, we
would add, they are likely to listen mainly to those
leaders whose messages comport with their own
predispositions—those who say what they want to hear
or, at least, can readily
^^^^^^^^^^^^1^^^ accept. On certain
issues, public officials
66t,, ^ .^. are an independent
source of policy prefer-
ences, with interests of
their own in governmen-
tal growth, autonomy in
decision making, or
security in office, among
other things.
The relative influence
of mass opinion is not a
fixed feature of the
political system. It will
vary, in particular, with
changes in how ordinary
citizens connect with the
political world. The
central factors are how
many voters respond to
issues in making choices
between parties or
candidates and how
many issues they
respond to. Those
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ quantities may vary over
time.
In the 1950s, at the
outset of survey research on mass political behavior,
mass politics was largely devoid of specific policy
issues. Most citizens had little awareness of issues or
ideologies. In voting, such citizens did not choose
between parties or candidates on the basis of their
liberalism or conservatism; they did not even under-
stand those terms. Nor did most citizens use particular
Most citizens
had little
awareness of
issues or
ideologies. In
voting, such
citizens did not
choose between
parties or
candidates on
the basis of their
liberalism or
conservatism;
they did not
even imderstand
those terms. "
issues to make choices. Instead, they chose between
candidates primarily on the basis of personal qualities
or party labels; and they chose between parties on the
basis of the parties' broad appeals to social groups or
their apparent success in producing peace and pros-
perity. Accordingly, parties and candidates emphasized
group appeals and symbolic themes in their cam-
paigns.
With most citizens so detached from debates over
policy, we would not expect public opinion to be a
dominant force in policy making. In such circum-
stances, the voters, by holding elected officials ac-
countable for the conspicuous results of their deci-
sions, should have considerable influence over the
general direction and priorities of government;
whether government is more active or less, whether it
makes new efforts to reduce crime, and the like. But
they should give policy experts little competition in
shaping specific strategies and measures. Policy
should pursue specific strategies, and meet criteria of
workability, that are largely defined by elite opinion. As
V. 0. Key wrote in 1964, "The articulation between
government and mass opinion is so loose that politi-
cians enjoy a considerable range of discretion within
which to exercise prudence and good sense."
Special interests in such circumstances, by con-
trast, should have influence over narrower, less
consequential issues, but with less constraint from
elite opinion. Facing only a modest risk of an effective
negative public response, policymakers should be
highly responsive to special interest demands. Elite
criticism should prevent special-interest policies that
would have readily noticeable harmful effects—for
example, to require a tax increase or reduce economic
growth perceptibly. But subsidies, anticompetitive
regulations, or other special-interest policies that
impose small, invisible costs on taxpayers or consum-
ers should be relatively easy to adopt and sustain.
The New Electorate
By the late-1960s, however, the public was becom-
ing more aware of issues. To an extent, the change
reflected secular increases in levels of education and
access to media. The proportion of voters with at least
some college education had been rising substantially
in the post-World War II era. The proportion of the
adult population with at least some college education
increased between 1960 and 1970 fi-om 16.5 percent to
21.2 percent. This 28 percent increase in the number
of college-educated adults came at a time of rapid
growth in sources of information. The number of book
titles and new editions offered for sale more than
doubled, and the numbers of commercial television
stations and AM radio stations each increased by
around one-quarter. Although newspaper circulation
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increased more slowly, the electorate of the 1970s was
better educated and had access to more information
than any previous generation. An increased awareness
of political issues was also stimulated by the social
unrest and divisive policy conflicts of the 1960s
—
especially the sharp ideological cleavage between the
two candidates, Democrat Lyndon Johnson and
Republican Barry Goldwater, in the 1964 presidential
election.
By the mid-1970s, political scientists were begin-
ning to describe a "changing American voter." Com-
pared with the 1950s,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ voters in the late 1960s
and early 1970s had
i^r^ 1 become more cognizantCompared
with the 1950s,
voters in the
late 1960s and
early 1970s had
become more
cognizant of the
basic terms of
political debate.
They were more
ideological in
their judgments
about issues
and more issue-
oriented in their
judgments of
candidates."
of the basic terms of
political debate. They
were more ideological in
their judgments about
issues and more issue-
oriented in their judg-
ments of candidates.
Students of mass
behavior mostly have
welcomed the new and
seemingly improved
post-1964 electorate.
Russell Dalton, who has
reviewed extensive
research documenting
the trend toward a more
sophisticated, issue-
oriented electorate not
only in the United
States, France, Great
Britain, and West
Germany, applauds it;
"As modern elector-
ates have become more
sophisticated and
politically interested,
and as the availability of political information has
expanded, many citizens are now better able to reach
their own voting decisions without relying on broad
external cues. . .In short, citizens now possess the
political resources to follow the complexities of
politics; they have the potential to act as the indepen-
dent voters described in classic democratic theory but
seldom observed in practice."
In one respect, overlooked in most discussions of
citizen competence, however, no such gains have been
registered—a point that makes Dalton's celebration
premature. An analysis of a half-century's survey
evidence shows that Americans in the 1990s have
essentially the same level of factual information about
government and public policy that they had fifty years
earlier. Despite dramatic advances in income, formal
education, and access to media, the proportion of
people who can, for example, give the name of the vice
president or identify the purpose of a major domestic
program has hardly changed. Nor can we suppose,
therefore, that voters have acquired any greater abilify
to make informed judgments about the issues in
politics. In short, the post-1964 electorate knows
where the parties and candidates stand on a number of
issues; but it may know little else about those issues.
The Response of Policymakers
As citizens have become more prone to judge
politicians on the basis of policies, politicians have
become more assiduous in figuring out what policies
citizens want. White House polling operations first
achieved state-of-the-art sophistication during Nixon's
presidency. President Jimmy Carter's pollster, Patrick
Caddell, was the first public-opinion analyst to join the
president's inner circle of policy advisers. The scale
of White House survey research has increased rapidly
in the 1980s and 1990s. Although with fewer resources
at their disposal, politicians outside the White House
are undoubtedly following suit. Moreover, election
campaigns of the past two decades have focused less
on party labels and more on issues and ideology. Issue-
oriented appeals, although often negative and almost
always highly superficial, have become the principal
currency of campaign politics.
With citizens far more oriented to policy debate
than they were in the 1950s, we would expect public
opinion to be a far more important, if not dominant,
force in policy making. The voters not only hold
elected officials accountable for results; they choose
them and often throw them out for their positions on
issues. In such circumstances, special interests should
lose a good deal of their influence. Policymakers who
defer to special-interest demands are at considerable
risk of coming under attack and losing support at the
next election.
With the public making more specific demands,
policy experts should also lose some of their influence.
In the face of powerful pressures from public opinion,
policymakers will no longer treat experts' judgments
about the workability of policies as a decisive consider-
ation in choosing them. In fact, the integrity of expert
advice will also suffer. K the pressures of public
opinion make policymakers less willing to listen to
experts, some experts will slant their advice to cater to
policymakers' inclinations, and indeed, therefore, to
public opinion.
Conclusion
We have suggested the sweeping proposition that
public opinion has become the dominant force in
American politics. We have not, however, provided
correspondingly broad support for that claim. Rather,
we have identified causes of this development in
changes in mass political behavior in the 1960s and
succeeding decades. And we have pointed to manifes-
tations of the public's dominant role in several of the
leading policy conflicts of the 1970s and early 1980s.
As students of mass behavior have demonstrated,
the American public changed considerably in the
decades after the 1950s, essentially the starting point
for modern survey research on political behavior By
the late 1960s or early 1970s, the public had become
more educated, more ideological, and, most important
for our purposes, more concerned about specific
issues of public policy. Put simply, more citizens were
expressing opinions or acting politically on more
issues than in prior periods of American history.
This increasing issue-engagement of the mass
public has had effects on the politics of policy. It has
increased the influence of ordinary citizens' beliefs and
concerns and that of rhetoric designed for their
consumption. Conversely, it has diminished the power
of organized interest groups. It has deprived public
officials of some autonomy. And because most people
do not follow policy debate in detail, it has sometimes
reduced the influence of experts and specialists and,
therefore, of careful thinking about policy problems.
To be sure, it is very difficult to make comparisons
of the influence of public opinion over time. And our
evidence is not conclusive. But it is suggestive. Several
of the preeminent policy developments of this period
have a common feature: TTiey reflect a distinctively
strong policy response, compared with previous
responses on the same issues, to the preferences of
ordinary citizens. Crudely stated, on clean air, govern-
ment-in-the-sunshine. Social Security benefits, petro-
leum prices, deregulation of trucking and other
protected industries, and reduced taxation, the public
got far more of what it has generally wanted in these
areas than ever before. In a sense, we infer a broad
change in performance—a rising influence of public
opinion—from the observation of remarkable defer-
ence to such opinion, by previous standards, in a wide
range of specific areas.
With an electorate more open to issue-based
appeals at election times, policymakers will attempt to
weigh public opinion, actual or anticipated, even when
issues are only moderately important and are decided
without attracting wide notice.
The responsiveness to mass opinion that produced
major liberal victories in the early 1970s later produced
an ideologically neutral, "good-government" reform,
trucking deregulation, and a huge conservative
victory, the Reagan tax cut. We believe that an in-
creased role of mass opinion has remained apparent in
major policy developments of the 1980s and 1990s: the
successful tax reform of 1986, the perpetual frustra-
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tions of reforming entitlements and reducing budget
deficits throughout this entire period, and the simplis-
tic and often extreme measures dealing with crime and
welfare in the 1990s,
among others. The ^m^m^^m^^m^^^mmm
duration of this tendency
and the variety of its
^'iVInrP than
policy effects point to ^^^^
™^
origins, not in any ever the
ideological shift or
transitory enthusiasm for WUinerS 111
participation, but rather in policy Conflict
a general and lasting
^^ ^j^^^^ ^j^^
change m the role of
^
issues in mass politics. enjoy the
Finally, the conse- advantage of
quences of this change for ^^ ^
the performance of more effective
government are mixed. appeals tO maSS
Public opinion is an
ooinion "
increasingly effective
"
'
weapon for policy advo-
cates of many stripes.
More than ever, the winners in policy conflict are those
who enjoy the advantage of more effective appeals to
mass opinion. As a result, policymaking is better
protected from narrow groups seeking private gain.
Special-interest benefits are easy targets for popular
rhetoric. But there is an important downside:
Policymaking is also more vulnerable to popular
leaders advancing dubious claims of entitlement,
offering emotional release, or promoting fantasy.
Paul J. Quirk is a professor in the Department of
Political Science at the University ofIllinois Urbana
Champaign and the Institute ofGovernment and Public
Affairs. Primarily a student ofnational government, he
has published widely on the presidency, Congress,
policymaking processes and public opinion.
Joseph Hinchliffe is a doctoral candidate in political
science at the University ofIllinois at Urbana-
Champaign and is an instructor in the Department of
Political Science at Illinois State University.
The authors received the 1999 Kelley-Wildavsky
Awardfor the best article by a senior author in the
Journal ofPolicy History during a two-year periodfor
this article. It appeared in Vol. 10 #i ofthat journal and
was reprinted in David Robertson, ed.. Loss ofConfi-
dence: The Chaneins Path ofPublic Policy in the 1970s
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). It was
originally presented at a conference at the Woodrow
Wilson Center ofthe Smithsonian Institution, Washing-
ton D.C, May 1997.
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Managed care patient protection laws
An expanded version
of this article is
available as Working
Paper #68 at the
IGPA web site:
www.igpa.uillinois.edu
Does good politics make good pol
By Russell Korobkin
Proposals to regulate the provision of health care
by managed care organizations have dominated state
legislatures' agendas during the 1990s. Nearly all
states have enacted laws designed to protect consum-
ers from the perceived ill-effects of managed care -
perhaps as many as 1000 patient protection laws have
been enacted nation-wide - and legislation continues
to be introduced at a rate, by some estimates, of as
many as 1000 bills per year. In 1999, virtually every
state considered new "patient protection" legislation.
The federal government has joined the legislation
bandwagon as well, enacting laws that limit the ability
of managed care organi-
zations to exclude
coverage for pre-existing
conditions and requiring
them to permit women
to remain in hospitals at
least 48 hours after
giving birth. This fall,
the House and Senate
passed competing
comprehensive patient protection bills, which now
await the attention of a House/Senate conference
committee.
Opinion surveys report that public support for
managed care regulation continues to increase,
leaving no doubt that patient protection is a potent
political issue. But is government intervention in the
managed care market warranted? And, if so, are
legislatures the best institutions for sorting out what
patient protections are desirable?
The rise of patient protection laws
During the 1980s, spiraling health care costs gave
rise to the prominence of "managed care," a variety of
icy?
institutional arrangements (including HMOs) for
delivering medical care in which the financing entity
takes an active role in monitoring and controlling the
amount and types of services provided to patients by
physicians. By 1995, nearly 75% of Americans with
employer-provided private insurance received their
medical care from a managed care organization, more
in some parts of the country. The market penetration of
managed care appears to have reduced health care
inflation, although the extent of this reduction is hotly
debated.
With the rise of managed care has come the
widespread public perception that providers offer too
little care for their customers. It is this perception that
has fueled the movement for protection legislation.
The majority of patient protection laws specify
benefits that managed care organizations doing
business in a jurisdiction must provide to all of their
customers. For example, most states have enacted laws
requiring managed care organizations to permit 48-
hour post-partum hospital stays, and many have
enacted similar minimum-stay requirements for
mastectomy patients. Most states either require
managed care organizations to permit female patients
access to an ob/gyn without a referral from a primary
care physician or to permit ob/gyn's to serve as
primary care physicians. Some states require that
coverage be provided for mental health care or sub-
stance abuse, prenatal care, or outpatient surgery.
Fewer require coverage for chiropractic treatment or
hospice care. A few states require private insurers to
provide in-vitro fertilization. Others require managed
care organizations to cover certain prescription drugs
or contraceptives. Many states require managed care
organizations to pay for emergency room visits for non-
emergencies when symptoms would have caused a
reasonable person to seek emergency care. Recently,
Visit the IGPA web site at: www.igpa.uillinois.edu
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States have begun to mandate that patients who are
denied treatment by managed care reviewers be
permitted to appeal the decision to an independent or
government body.
Problems and possibilities in protection laws
Opponents of patient protection laws often contend
that the unregulated market will ensure that America
devotes the right amount of resources, no more and no
less, to health care. Economist Patiicia Danzon
succinctiy states tiie basic free-market argument:
In the managed care marketplace, if plans
compete on price, choice, and quality, they have
incentives to cover services that yield expected
health benefits that are worth their costs to
consumers . .
.
Consumers self-select to different types of
health plans, based on their preferences for cost,
coverage, copayment, prompt access to new
technologies, restrictions on choice, and so forth.
Thus consumers' choices among health plans
reflect their preferences and willingness-to-pay . .
.
From this perspective, if managed care organiza-
tions systematically provide reduced benefits and
services at relatively low cost, then this must be
because consumers prefer such a price/benefits
combination. The popularity of managed care means
that consumers prefer cheaper and more restrictive
health care coverage to a higher-priced, more compre-
hensive alternative. Patient protection laws are unde-
sirable, under this view, because they effectively force
consumers to pay for benefits that they do not want, at
least at the resulting higher prices.
The claim that the market can produce an efficient
amount of health care is based on a number of critical
assumptions. First, the claim assumes that there is
meaningful competition among managed care organi-
zations. In regions of the country without such compe-
tition, however, the dominant organization might have
the incentive to provide customers with a low level of
benefits in order to earn more profits.
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Second, the claim assumes away possible market
distortions attributable to the fact that many insurance
purchasing decisions are made by employers rather
than by consumers themselves. The vast majority of
privately insured Americans receive their healtii care
coverage through their employer. For virtually all of
these consumers, choice is limited to the plans the
employer chooses to offer. (Nearly half of employers
offer only one plan.) If employers select cheaper
health plans that provide more limited benefits than
employees would themselves choose if they had
complete purchasing autonomy but had to pay the full
cost of the coverage, the _
market might provide an
inefficiently low level of
coverage that could be
remedied by patient
protection laws.
Most importantiy, the
free-market claim
assumes that consumers
gather detailed informa-
tion about their insur-
ance options and are
able to process that
information flawlessly.
That is, it assumes
consumers carefully
compare the detailed
descriptions and fine
print of insurance plans;
make complicated
tradeoffs between price
and benefits; and that
they reward the man-
aged care organizations ^^^_^.^^_^^_^^_^^
that tailor their offerings
to the customer's preference with enrollment and
punish those tiiat fail to do so by selecting competing
plans.
In fact, making such optimal trade-offs between
price and coverage is difficult and time consuming.
Research on consumer decision making in a variety of
contexts indicates that the more complex a purchasing
decision is and the more difficult it is to understand
the information on various product attributes - both of
which are true for the purchase of health insurance -
the more likely a consumer is to adopt short cuts in
the decision making process to economize on time and
effort. Consumers are most likely to do this by basing
their purchasing decision on either a single product
atbibute or a handful of atbibutes, ignoring others.
For example, a typical health consumer might
respond to the complexity of the choice between
insurance plans by selecting the plan with the most
doctors. Or he might attempt to compare plans on a
small number of attributes, such as the number of
If employers
select cheaper
health plans that
provide more
limited benefits
than employees
would themselves
choose..., the
market might
provide an
inefficiently low
level of coverage
that could be
remedied by
patient protection
laws."
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doctors participating in each plan under consideration,
the monthly premiums of the plans, and the generosity
of the plans' prescription drug coverage. He is un-
likely, however, to attempt to take all of the benefits
offered by each plan into account when making a
purchasing decision.
If health care consumers consider only a limited
number of product attributes when making insurance
purchasing decisions, and if price is one of the at-
tributes that hits the radar screen of consumers, the
ability of the unregulated market to provide consumers
with their most desired combination of price and
benefits is greatly undermined. In the competition for
customers, managed care organizations will have an
incentive to skimp on all benefits that are not likely to
affect many customers' purchasing decisions, in an
effort to keep a lid on prices.
To see why this is problematic, consider the
following example. If the presence or absence of a
guarantee to provide 48 hours of postpartum mater-
nity care is not one of the limited numbers of attributes
most consumers consider, a given managed care
organization will have an incentive not to provide the
guarantee. Consumers will not notice the lack of the
benefit when selecting an insurance plan, so the
organization will not lose customers. But the resulting
cost savings can help the organization offer a lower
price, which consumers will notice, giving the organi-
zation a competitive advantage in the market place.
Other managed care organizations will have to follow
suit to remain competitive.
If the cost of providing the post-partum care
guarantee is larger than what most consumers would
be willing to pay for it, the absence of the benefit is
desirable. But if most consumers would, in fact, be
willing to pay the cost of the guarantee in order to have
it, then the free market, in this example, will have
provided consumers with too little in the way of
insurance benefits. In such a situation, a law requiring
managed care organizations to provide the benefit
would be desirable because it would enable consumers
to purchase a benefit that they are willing to pay for
but that the free market would not otherwise provide.
Choosing the Right Patient Protections
Patient protection laws are desirable when the free
market would otherwise fail to provide a benefit most
consumers would wish to pay for, but are undesirable
when consumers do not value the benefit in question
enough to pay the cost of providing it. The challenge
for policy makers, then, is to enact desirable protec-
tions while avoiding undesirable protections.
Leaving this task to legislators creates two con-
cerns. First, small but well-organized interest groups
are likely to have an undue influence on the legislative
process. The consequence of this is that legislatures
might enact mandates not because doing so promotes
efficiency in the allocation of social resources, but
because doing so benefits a particular politically
powerful group, such as health care providers.
Second, even legislatures that attempt to enact only
socially beneficial laws are likely to select precisely the
wrong patient protections because of the realities of
the legislative process. Vocal consumer support is a
necessary precondition for a public-spirited legislature
to mandate a particular benefit But if a benefit is
critical enough to consumers for them to petition their
representatives for legislation, it will probably also play
a role in the purchasing decisions of many, which in
turn means that the unregulated market will most
likely provide the benefit if most consumers are willing
to pay its cost. Government action, in such cases,
either is unnecessary or undesirable. Ironically, the
benefits that go unnoticed by consumers (before they
become ill) and therefore don't generate lobbying are
the very benefits that managed care organizations are
likely to provide too littie of in the private market.
Without public pressure, legislatures are unlikely to
identify targets for patient protection legislation.
In light of these problems, rather than determining
specific patient protections themselves, state legisla-
tures and the U.S.
^^^^
Congress should del- ^^^^^^^^^ ^
egate tiie power of
^Rather thandetermmmg which
. .
benefits should be determining
mandated and which specific patient
mrttritof protections
specially created, inde- themselveS, State
pendent commissions. legislatures and
Commissions could
^ y.S. CongreSS
eitiier be given tiie power " u j i
to set benefits mandates should delegate
directiy through regula- the pOWCr of
tion, or tiie charge of determining which
providing a list of desir- i u u
able mandates tiiat tiie benefits ShOUld DC
legisiauire could approve mandated in the
or disapprove without
^^^^^ ^f specially
amendment ^
Placing the specific Created,
decision making respon- independent
sibility in tiie hands of
commissions."
commissions would offer
^_^^^_^^^^^_^^_
at least three advantages
fi-om the policy-making perspective. First they can be
composed of scientists and economists with the
technical abilities to determine which benefits not
provided by the market should be mandated in order
to improve the efficient allocation of resources to
health care. Second, they can be charged with the task
of evaluating potential patient protections that have not
spavraed lobbying efforts on their behalf. Third,
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commission members can be given terms sufficiently
lengthy to substantially insulate them from interest
group politics.
Conclusion
The public backlash against the perceived excesses
of managed care has made patient protection a popular
political issue in the 1990s at the state and federal
levels of government. Opponents of such legislation
contend that it is undesirable because it forces con-
sumers to spend more money on health insurance
benefits than they wish to spend.
There are good reasons to believe that various
market imperfections are likely to encourage managed
care organizations to provide an undesirably low level
of benefits. Because of these market imperfections,
patient protection laws can be desirable under certain
conditions. The trick is enacting the desirable protec-
tions while avoiding undesirable protections that
would force consumers to pay for benefits that that
they value at less than the benefits' cost. Expert
commissions are more likely to succeed in this
endeavor than legislatures.
The "bad news" about patient protection laws is
that we have to pay for all the health care benefits that
we wish to receive. The "good news" is that we can use
government intervention in the marketplace to insure
that we receive all the health insurance benefits for
which we are willing to pay.
Russell Korobkin is an assistant professor at IGPA
and the University ofIllinois College ofLaw.
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Casino gambling causes crime
By Earl L Grinols
Evidence is converging to show that casino
gambling causes significant increases in crime. Taken
altogether, casinos impose crime and other costs
-
paid for by society, including those who do not gamble
- that exceed their benefits and represent substantial
burdens on nearby populations. Because casino
gambling fails a cost-benefit test, policymakers should
give serious consideration to options that include
imposing taxes equal to tiie costs casinos impose,
restricting casino expansion, or banning casino
gambling altogether
Crime is affected by multiple factors including
population density, tiie number of males and females
in different age ranges, percent of each age group tiiat
is white, percent of each age group tiiat is black, per
capita personal income, unemployment rates, per
capita retirement compensation, per capita income
maintenance payments, and "shall issue" laws (^ving
citizens tiie right to carry concealed firearms upon
request—believed to reduce certain crimes). Hence,
connecting any single cause such as casinos to crime
is controversial. Only by careful sifting of a large body
of data can the effect of casinos be separated fi-om
other causes to establish a connection. The gambling
industi-y natiirally has resisted research findings that
link casinos to more crime.
How do researchers conclude tiiat casinos cause
crime and measure the size of the connection? There
are two ways—tiie first is ti:irough the study of
problem and patiiological gamblers and tiie second is
through statistical analysis of crime numbers.
Connecting casinos to crime
Pathological gambling is a recognized impulse
conti-ol disorder of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM-IV) of the Am.erican Psychiatiic
Association. Pathological gamblers (often referred to
as 'addicted" or "compulsive" gamblers) are identified
by a number of characteristics including repeated
failures to resist tiie urge to gamble, loss of control
over their gambling, personal lives and employment,
reliance on otiiers to relieve a desperate financial
situation caused by gambling, and tiie committing of
illegal acts to finance gambling. Problem gamblers
have similar problems, but to a lesser degree.
It appears tiiat a significant proportion of tiie
population is susceptible to problem or patiiological
gambling. The latent propensity becomes overt when
the opportunity to gamble
is provided and sufficient
time has elapsed for the
problem to manifest.
Pathological gamblers are
generally found to
constitute one or D<vo
percent of the population
and problem gamblers
are another two to tiiree
percent in areas where
For more on
gambling, see
Ugal Gambling in
Illinois: A Primer
at the IGPA web site:
www.igpa.uillinois.edu
casino gambling is available. One study of gam.blers in
treatment found tiiat 62 percent committed illegal aas
as a result of tiieir gambling. Eighty percent had
committied civil offenses and 23 percent were charged
with criminal offenses, according to a 1990 Maryland
Department of Healtii and Mental Hygiene survey A
similar survey of nearly 400 members of Gambler's
Anonymous showed tiiat 57 percent admitted stealing
to finance their gambling. Moreover, tiie amounts are
not small. On average tiiey stole $135,000, and total
theft was over $30 million, according to die testimony
of Henry Lesieur fi-om the Institute of Problem Gam-
bling before tiie National Gambling Impact Study
Commission, Atiantic City, New Jersey, January 22,
1998. The National Gambling Impact Shidy
Commission's final report issued in June 1999 reported
that among those who did not gamble (had not
gambled in the past year) only 7 percent had ever been
^ff IGPA-UrnvtrniyoflUmou
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incarcerated. In contrast, more than three times this
number (21.4 percent) of individuals who had been
pathological gamblers at any point during their lifetime
had been incarcerated.
By tallying up the crimes of pathological and
problem gamblers and the associated costs to society
such as police, apprehension, adjudication, and
incarceration costs, the average crime costs to society
of an additional pathological or problem gambler
(some studies lump the two groups together) can be
determined. Recent research using this methodology
found that an average problem gambler costs society
$10,112 per year. Crime costs constituted $4,225, or 42
percent of these costs.
Combining crime costs with studies of the preva-
lence of pathological and problem gamblers provides
crime cost tlgures for society as a whole. Using the
numbers just reported implies annual crime costs per
adult capita of $57, This number can be compared to
the crime costs found by the second method for
relating casinos to crime.
Connections in crime statistics
A second way to determine the effect of casinos on
crime is to look directly at aggregate crime statistics.
The advantage is that the method is direct, and
—
because it looks at more than just the crimes commit-
ted by problem and pathological gamblers— it is more
inclusive. The disadvantage is that it may be difficult to
distinguish the share of crime related to casinos from
the mass of other crime that occurs all the dme.
Moreover, the period of major casino expansion in the
United States, 1991 to 1997, coincides with a period of
secular decline in overall crime rates. It would be
tempting, therefore, to observe that crime fell after a
particular casino was introduced and from this con-
clude that the casino reduced crime. Such a conclusion
would be false if crime would have fallen even further
without the casino. Finally, because the effects of
casinos might differ in different areas, a large sample
could be needed to reliably pinpoint the truth.
In research conducted at the University of Illinois
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were absent.
"
and the University of Georgia and with these factors in
mind. Professor David Mustard, Cynthia Hunt Dilley
and I examined crime statistics for all 3,165 counties in
the United States for twenty years beginning with year
1977. This period covers the period of introduction of
casinos in all counties with the exception of Nevada.
The number of offenses for the 7 FBI Index I offenses
(robbery, aggravated assault, rape, murder, larceny,
burglary, and auto theft) was obtained from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime
Report County-Level Data. We obtained U.S. Census
Bureau data to control for
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
demographic, income,
and other variables that 4^
affect crime as described 1 uC TSW data
above. In all, 54 variables suggestS... that
were used to explain -, r, < <. r
observed cnme rates ^2.4 percent ot
across counties and time. the CniTie
We included twelve observed in
variables to identify each • , •
year from four years CasmO COUntieS
before the opening of the WOuld nOt be
first casino in a county to there if CasinOS
seven years after it
opened. These variables
serve two purposes: first,
„B«^B»B»Bii™«i^«^^^«M
to distinguish the effects
of casinos from changes that preceded their opening
(for example, a trend toward lawlessness conceivably
could lead to the opening of a casino instead of the
reverse) ; and second, to sort out the timing of those
effects (an effect on crime could take several years to
develop). To find the dates for the first casino opening
we contacted state gaming authorities in every state,
called casinos to find opening date or date of first Class
III gambling (in many cases casinos began as bingo
halls and switched at a later date), and used casino
internet website information to check our data. The
final list was verified against the annually produced
Executive's Guide to North American Casinos.
What did the data show? If property crime rates
are indexed so that 1982 rates equal 100, then the
crime rate in 1991 was 99.7 in non-casino counties
(counties that had no casinos during the sample
period) and 100.3 in casino counties (counties that had
a casino by the end of the sample period)—hardly any
difference at all. However, looking at the same statistic
just 5 years later—after casinos had begun operation in
the majority of the casino counties—the indexes stood
at 82.1 for non-casino counties and 93.7 for casino
counties. The raw data suggests, therefore, that 12.4
percent of the crime observed in casino counties
would not be there if casinos were absent. A similar
picture emerges for violent crimes.
The problem with using the raw data for infer-
ences, however, is that direct comparisons do not take

Policy Forum 3
into account other factors that cause crime. For
example, it is well known that crime rates in areas of
high population density tend to be higher. What if
between 1991 and 1996 casino counties experienced a
significant increase in their population density? Then
some or all of the increased crime might be due to the
change in population density. This is why we collected
so many other variables and applied regression
procedures to them—to separate die changes in crime
rates due to other factors from those due to casinos.
After adjusting for all of the other factors an
interesting picture begins to emerge, both in terms of
the share of crime in casino counties due to casinos
and in terms of the pattern that the changes take over
time. The data indicated that compared to non-casino
counties there was no discernable difference in crime
in casino counties in the four years before casinos
opened that could be attributed to the opening of
casinos. (We did not expect to find any connection, so
this finding was anticipated.) For the first three years
after the casino began operation, there also was no
significant impact on crime rates. After the third year.
however, crime rates began to rise in casino counties
compared to those without casinos. By 1996, casinos
accounted for 10.3 percent of the observed violent
crime and 7.7 percent of the observed property crime
in casino counties. Estimates of the share of crime
attributable to casinos in 1996 for individual crimes
ranged from 3 to 30 percent. Auto theft was the
highest, followed by robbery at 20 percent. (In addi-
tion to stealing an auto, auto theft includes taking parts
of cars such as expensive sound equipment as well as
things from or out of a car.) The values for the rest of
the offenses were between 3 and 10 percent.
Criminologists in the late 1980s and early 1990s
estimated the cost per victimization of different types
of crime. Applying these costs to the implied number
of offenses for each crime due to casinos and dividing
by the adult population of casino counties in 1996
produced an annual cost for casino-induced crime of
$63 per adult capita. This figure is remarkably close to
the $57 per adult capital crime cost estimated through
the study of problem and pathological gamblers.
Implications
Critics of casino gambling point to a num.ber of
social costs. In addition to the direct governmental
costs of regulating casinos and providing social
services occasioned by gambling, these include the
costs of bankruptcy, illness, suicide, harm to families,
lost economic output, and crime, among others.
Research to pinpoint the size of many of these costs is
still in its beginning stages. This paper has described
research directed to determining the costs to society
of just seven Index 1 crimes tracked by the FBI:
Larceny, burglary, auto theft, robbery, aggravated
assault, rape, and murder. In areas with casinos the
evidence points to costs of $63 per adult per year, but
other studies that provided information on all of the
social costs of casinos suggest that the total is over
$100 per adult annually. Estimates implying costs of
$135, $150 and more are common.
The social benefits
of casinos are the ^^'^^^^^^^^^^^"'
increase in profits and U^^
^^^.^^
taxes trom casinos
.
(casino profits and taxes gambling
less lost profits and taxes cannot be
of other businesses due
^^-^^^^ -^
to casinos) plus the . •'
convenience value to that CauSG it tO
consumers of having p^gS a COSt-
casinos nearby com- benefit test
pared to having to travel
o ilL L bL,
greater distances to then banning it
gamble. Research on the (^^lS waS done
benefits suggests they .,
.in :
are no larger than $40 ^^^11 receniiyj IS
per adult annually. Thus preferable On
casino gambling fails a eCOnomic
cost-benetlt test by a
substantial margin in
terms of Index I crimes
terms.
alone.
It is an open question whether casino gambling
can be offered in a way that allows citizens who could
gamble without harm to do so while at the same time
preventing the creation of problem and pathological
gamblers and the social costs already discussed. If
casino gambling cannot be offered in ways that cause
it to pass a cost-benefit test, then banning it (as was
done until recendy) is preferable on economic terms.
In light of the evidence, what can a responsible
legislator do? One option is to tax casinos by an
amount equal to the costs that they impose on society.
As we have shown, a conservative estimate of these
costs is about $100 annually per nearby resident. Since
casinos typically take in revenues of around $200 per
adult each year from nearby residents, such a
tax would represent 50 percent of casino revenues. If
social costs were ultimately determined to be higher,
required taxes would also be higher. With
taxes imposed at the appropriate level, some casinos
would go out of business. Only those casinos that
could pass a cost-benefit test by compensating society
for the damage they do would operate.
Dr. Earl Grinols is a professor m the Depariment of
Economics, University ofIllinois Urbana-Champaign
and an affiliate of the Institute of Government and
Public Affairs. University of Illinois.
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Race, Prejudice and Policy in Illinois
Thomas M. Carsey
Barry S. Rundquist
Gerald Strom and
Sean Hogan
Race has been a central feature of the American
political landscape since the nation's founding. Since
the 1960s, the cleavage created by racial issues has
been as significant as any division in American
politics. Study after study shows that whites and
African Americans hold different views on many
policies. As politicians and citizens continue to focus
attention on social policies like affirmative action, it
becomes increasingly important to understand
whether these differences are shaped by underlying
racial stereotypes or animosities.
More speciJQcally, do differences in policy views
stem from whites' negative feelings toward African-
Americans? Many scholars argue that overt racism
among whites has declined in recent decades as
expressing openly racist views has become less
socially acceptable. Some of these scholars claim,
however, that overt racism has been replaced by
"symbolic racism." Symbolic racism theorists argue
that, although more socially acceptable opposition to
race-based policies has replaced direct assertions of
white superiority, the underlying racial prejudice
remains. Other scholars question whether opposition
to race-based policies constitutes racism, symbolic or
otherwise. Couldn't opposition to policies like busing
or affirmative action be based on non-racist,
ideological or partisan grounds? In other words,
critics of the symbolic racism thesis argue, opposition
to policies like affirmative action may stem from
traditional Republican or conservative support for a
limited role of government. In this sense, partisanship
and ideology compete with racial attitudes as
explanations of why whites and blacks differ in their
support for various public policies.
Tlie recent devolution of power from the federal to
the state level has cleared the way for states to
consider significant changes in a number of policy
areas, including affirmative action, welfare policy, and
others. Knowing whether policy preferences differ
between racial groups and whether people's policy
views reflect their attitudes toward racial groups is
increasingly important for state governments as they
make choices on these various issues.
This article explores the attitudes Illinois residents
hold on the issues of abortion, affirmative action,
education spending, and welfare spending. Specifically,
do whites and African-Americans hold different views
on these issues and are the policy views held by whites
affected by the attitudes they hold toward African-
Americans? It also explores the competing influences
of ideology and partisanship on those views.
Why these policy areas? Affirmative action, which
often concerns preferential treatment for minority
groups, is explicitly about race. Attitudes toward
affirmative action should exhibit the maximum racial
effects. At the other extreme, abortion has no obvious
racial connotation. Abortion has been framed as a
question of rights and morals. In between affirmative
action and abortion, in this respect, are spending for
welfare and education. Neither of these policy areas
explicitly targets one racial group over another.
However, welfare spending is often viewed as
benefiting African-Americans more than whites
because of differences in rates of poverty between the
two groups. Similarly, education spending is often
debated in terms of differential rates of public school
spending in predominantly white suburbs versus mbced
or predominantly non-white central cities. Whdi this
paper seeks to show is the degree to which race and
racial attitudes shape policy preferences across these
four policy areas.
The data for this analysis comes from a statewide
survey of a random sample of 868 Illinois residents
conducted from October 19 to 25, 1998. TTie interviews
^ IGPA umv^stty ofiuwou Visit the IGPA web site at: www.igpa.uillinois.edu
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Table 1: Views held by Whites and African-Americans on four policies
Whites African-Americans
Abortion should be Legal in
All Circumstances 28% 30%
Some Circumstances 54% 50%
No Circumstance 18% 20%
Generally Support Affirmative Action
Yes 47% 77%
Some Circumstances 25% 12%
No 28% 11%
Spending on Education
Too Uttle 69% 74%
About Right 22% 15%
Too Much 9% 11%
Spending on Welfare
Too Uttle 20% 39%
About Right 41% 31%
Too Much 39% 30%
were conducted by students under the direction of the
Political Science Department at the University of
Illinois at Chicago (UIC). The Institute of Government
and Public Affairs, the Political Science department at
UIC, and the Office of Social Science Research at UIC
supported the survey.
Policy Preferences Among Blacks and Whites
Table 1 shows the percentages of whites and
African-Americans in Illinois who held various views
on abortion, affirmative action, and spending for
education and welfare. The table shows that whites
and African-Americans hold significantly different
views on affirmative action and welfare spending.
Seventy-seven percent of African-Americans generally
support affirmative action programs for disadvantaged
minorities while 47 percent of whites do. Similarly, 39
percent of African-Americans believe too little is spent
on welfare/public assistance for the poor while 20
percent of whites feel that too little is being spent in
this area. In contrast, the views held by whites and
African-Americans on abortion and spending for
Policy Forum is an occasional publication
that presents discussions and results of recent
research on important policy issues.
Manuscripts by university and non-university
are welcome.
Scott Koeneman, Manging Editor
IGPA University of Illinois
1007 W. Nevada St.
Urbana,IL 61801
Email: skoenema@uiuc.edu
education do not differ significantly. This suggests that
abortion and education spending are not viewed as
race-based policies.
Of course, the differences observed in Table 1 may
be the result of factors other than race. To ensure that
this is not the case, we conducted a series of statistical
analyses to control for the possible effects of party
identiflcation, ideology, gender, income, education, and
residence in Chicago or the Chicago suburbs
compared to the rest of the state. Tliese analyses
confirm the basic pattern presented in Table 1. Even
when other relevant factors are held constant, African-
Americans have significantly different views from
whites on affirmative action and welfare spending, but
not on abortion or education spending.
Whites' Racial Attitudes and Policy Preferences
The survey found that whites and African
Americans hold different policy views when the policy
in question bears directly on race. What we do not yet
know is whether whites' lower levels of support for
affirmative action and welfare spending reflect
negative attitudes about African-Americans as a group.
We examine only whites in this section because of
limited sample sizes for other racial and ethnic groups.
Also, scholars have noted that white support is often
necessary in legislating policies that target minority
populations.
In our survey, we asked respondents a variety of
questions about their attitudes toward various groups
of people. Among these questions, we asked whether
they agreed strongly, agreed somewhat, disagreed
somewhat or disagreed strongly that five different
traits generally describe most African-Americans.
Respondents evaluated whether they thought most
African-Americans are: hard working, greedy,
intelligent, violent, and warm/compassionate. Other
Policy Forum 3
scholars have used this method of measuring the
willingness of individuals to apply positive or negative
traits to groups of people to estimate racial prejudice.
Responses to all trait questions were scored as +2,
+1, -1 or -2. If the respondent strongly agreed that a
positive trait described most African-Americans, or if
they strongly disagreed that a negative trait described
most African-Americans, they received a score of +2,
indicating a highly favorable opinion. K they felt
strongly in the reverse direction, they received a score
of -2, indicating a highly unfavorable one. If they only
agreed or disagreed somewhat, they received a score
of +1 or -1, respectively. TTien we summed the
respondents' answers to the five trait questions to
construct their overall attitudes toward African-
Americans, with a possible range of -10 to 10, with
negative numbers indicating unfavorable attitudes
The average overall measure was 3.9, meaning the
average white in Illinois holds a somewhat positive
view of African-Americans. In fact, 66 percent reported
a positive view on all five traits. On the other hand, 16
percent of whites scored a zero or lower on the
measure of attitudes toward African-Americans.
Does the level of prejudice toward African-
Americans as a group influence the views whites hold
on public policy matters like affirmative action,
abortion, or spending on education and welfare? To
answer this question, a statistical analysis of whites'
overall evaluations of African-Americans was
conducted. This analysis allows us to assess the impact
of whites' evaluations of African-Americans on their
policy views, while statistically controlling for party
identification, ideology, gender, income, education, and
residence in Chicago, the Chicago suburbs, and the
rest of the state.
TTie pattern of findings here parallels those
presented in the first section. Whites who report a
more favorable view of African-Americans are more
likely to support affirmative action than are whites
who report a less favorable view of African-Americans.
The same is true regarding spending on welfare
programs. Whites who more consistently describe
African-Americans in positive terms are significantly
more likely to believe that too little is being spent on
welfare compared to those who view African-
Americans less favorably. The pattern for abortion
policy and spending on education differs. The views
whites hold regarding these two policies are unrelated
to the level of prejudice whites hold regarding African-
Americans as a group.
The evidence from this analysis shows that
affirmative action and welfare policies are seen, at least
by some whites, as polices concerning race. The
attitudes whites hold about African-Americans in
general shape their attitudes toward these policies. In
contrast, abortion and the level of education spending
appear not to be viewed by whites as race-related
policies. As we discuss in our conclusions, these
findings have implications for how much public
support can be generated for increased government
effort in these various policy areas.
What about the influence of partisanship and
ideology? Our analysis shows that both partisanship
and ideology act independently on the views whites
hold on affirmative action and welfare spending. As
expected, Republicans and conservatives are more
likely to oppose affirmative action and increased
spending for welfare, while Democrats and liberals are
more likely to support both. Partisanship, ideology,
and attitudes towards African-Americans influenced
support for affirmative action policy among whites at
about equal levels of magnitude. Regarding attitudes
on welfare spending, the influence of feelings toward
African-Americans and ideology were roughly equal,
with effects that were both about 2.5 times larger than
the effect of partisanship. It is important to note that
there is not a significant correlation between the
attitudes whites hold toward African-Americans and
either their reported party identification or their
reported ideology. Among whites. Republicans or
conservatives are no more or less likely to report
more negative views of African-Americans than are
Democrats or liberals.
To summarize, some whites oppose affirmative
action and increases in welfare spending because of
negative attitudes towards African-Americans, but
others do so for partisan or ideological reasons.
Conclusions
Scholars have debated whether whites' attitudes
toward policies like affirmative action and welfare
spending represent manifestations of symbolic racism.
On this question we offer two points. First, simple
opposition to these policies among whites should not
be interpreted as racism: partisanship and ideology
play an important role. Second, the influence of racial
attitudes, never the less, has a major impact on the
views held by whites on affirmative action and welfare
spending. The effect of attitudes about African-
Americans on support for welfare spending among
whites is more than twice the magnitude of the effect
of partisanship and about equal to the effect of
ideology. Additionally, the effect of whites' racial
feelings on their attitudes toward welfare spending is
considerably greater than of race itself: the difference
between a white with positive feelings toward African
Americans and one with negative feelings is twice as
great as the difference between a typical white and a
typical black. The effects of partisanship, ideology, and
attitudes regarding African-Americans are all equally
important in influencing support among whites for
affirmative action. The baseline racial difference and
the effect of whites' feelings toward African-Americans
have about the same relative importance in
determining support for affirmative action. Clearly,
negative feelings about African-Americans as a group
impinge significantly on whites' policy preferences in
these two policy areas.
Scholars Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines
argue in their book Reaching Beyond Race, that a
fundamental question underlying race-based policies is
the traditional debate over the proper role of
government. Because programs like affirmative action
and welfare spending are also evaluated in terms of
race, this reduces the ability of governments to adopt
or expand efforts in these policy areas to redress racial
inequalities. By raising both the role-of-government
question and the race issue, race-based social welfare
policies provide two avenues for citizen opposition: one
based on traditional partisan or conservative ideals and
one based on racial prejudice. As a result, supporters
of such policies are left with trying to assemble a
coalition of supporters from among non-prejudiced
white liberals and African-Americans that is often not
large enough to create or sustain support for these
programs.
Sniderman and Carmines conclude that social
welfare policies designed to help those most in need
will win more public support, "if they are championed
on the basis of universal principles that reach beyond
race instead of being justified on racially specific
grounds." This has the virtue of replacing the
divisiveness of race with, "the principle of fairness that
all who need help should be helped, regardless of their
race."
Our analysis suggests that education policy has this
potential. Numerous scholars and policy advocates
argue that crime, unemployment, poverty, teen
pregnancy, and a whole host of social ills stem in part
from insufficient education. Expanding and improving
education would presumably work to curb some of
these problems, both by improving the skills of
individuals (human capital) and by improving overall
life in the community (social capital). Our analysis
shows that support for increased education spending
is not influenced by racial attitudes despite the fact that
many of these problems disproportionately affect
racial minorities and many of the most needy schools
serve large minority populations. Of course, our
survey question asked only about the level of
education spending and not about support for different
sorts of proposed educational reforms. Thus, we might
uncover different patterns in support for changes in
education policy depending upon the specific policy
being considered.
Illinois is not unique regarding the politics of race
and race-based policy. The challenge facing states like
Illinois is in how to deal with these issues in a climate
of increasing devolution of policy responsibility from
the federal level to states.
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TIF districts iiindir growin
study finds that cities without TIFs grow faster
By Richard F. E>ye
and David F. Merriman
Tax increment financing (TIF) is a policy tool
used by municipalities in Illinois and 46 other
states to stimulate economic growth in a
designated area of a
city or village that is ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
by statutory definition
"blighted." Do TIF
districts work—that
is, do they spur
economic growth?
Our analysis of 235
municipalities in the
metropolitan Chicago
region finds cities,
towns, and villages
that had TIF districts
actually grew more
slowly than
municipalities that did
not use TIF
Our analysis
of 235 munici-
palities in the
metropolitan
Chicago region
finds cities...
that had TIF
districts actually
grew more
slowly than
municipalities
that did not use
TIE"With tax increment
financing, a ^^^^^^^^^^^^""^
municipality seeks to
promote economic development by allowing
certain areas, designated as TIF districts, to use
the tax revenues generated by increases in the
assessed value of properties within them for
investment in the district For example, the
improvement of a commercial property within a
TIF district may increase the value of that
property fi-om $200,000 to $300,000. Applying the
combined tax rate of the municipality, the school
district, and all other local governments, this
increase in property value will result in, say,
$3,000 in additional property taxes collected from
the owner The TIF district is then allowed to use
all of this $3,000 "tax increment" to finance public
infrastructure or to reimburse private developers
for start-up costs. TIF district expenditures are
often financed by borrowing against 20 or more
years of future revenues.
Why use incentives?
Economists identify four main reasons why
local governments might want to use economic
development initiatives such as TIF. They might
seek to improve blighted areas. They might seek
to overcome "market failures" that inhibit
development, such as when the cost of locating in
an area is disproportionately high for the first
entrants. In some cases, they might want to use
development initiatives to compete with other
municipalities in bidding wars for new
development. In addition, some critics argue that
a municipality might want to use TIF to gain
property tax revenue at the expense of the other
local governments, such as school districts, in the
same area. As a rule of thumb, municipalities
receive about 15 percent of property tax revenues
in Illinois, school districts 60 percent, and 25
percent goes to all other local governments. The
TIF district captures all incremental property tax
revenue, including the money that would
otherwise go to schools and the other local
governments.
^/ IGPA University ofIllinois
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Figure 1: Annual Percentage Growth Rates in Municipal
Property Value for Pre-TIF Adoption and Post-Adoption
Periods
8 1 y^
D
A §r
•
4
Z
Pre-adoption
(1980-1984)
Post-adoption
(1992-1995)
Adoptors 4.94 4.96
Non-
Adoptors
4.47 7.38
Adopters
Non-Adoptors
Whatever the intention, however, designation
of a portion of a municipality as a TIF district
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could actually cause an increase, decrease, or no
change at all in the overall economic growth of
the municipality. If a TIF district enables a city to
correct market failures, the municipality should
grow faster than otherwise. If a TIF district
simply redistributes growth from one part of a
municipality to another, perhaps less suitable,
area, a municipality should grow at about the
same rate or even more slowly overall than it
would have otherwise.
To find out how TIF affects economic
development, 235 cities, towns, and villages in the
six counties of northeastern Illinois (not
including Chicago) were analyzed. Eighty-one of
Policy Forum 3
What we
find... is a
negative
relationship.
Municipalities
that use TIF do
worse.
"
these municipalities had TIF districts; 154 did not.
For each of these cities, towns, and villages, we
analyzed the change in assessed value for the
years 1980-84 (the pre-TIF adoption period) and
1992-95 (the post-adoption period).
Property values stagnant
The results are clear and discouraging. Figure
1 shows that the rate of grov^lh in property values
for municipalities with TIF districts was virtually
the same in the post-adoption period as it was in
the pre-adoption period. In contrast, the cities,
towns, and villages without TIF districts grew
much more rapidly in the post-adoption period
than earlier. There
m^^^a^^m^^^^t^^ ^^^< of course, many
variables that affect
the growth rates of
municipalities apart
from the decisions to
create TIF districts.
Statistical techniques
were used to account
for factors such as
fiscal structure,
community type,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
property tax rates,
location and size of
municipality, size of
TIF district, and the number of years since
adoption of the TIF district to see how each might
affect the basic findings. Altiiough controlling for
these factors narrows the difference in post-
adoption growth rates, it does not overturn the
fundamental finding that TIF municipalities grew
more slowly than those without TIF districts.
If the use of tax increment financing stimulates
economic development, there should be a positive
relationship between TIF adoption and overall
growth in municipalities. This did not occur. If,
on the other hand, TIF merely moves capital
around within a municipality, there should be no
relationship between TIF adoption and growrth.
What we find, however, is a negative relationship.
Municipalities that use TIF do worse.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that
government subsidies reallocate property
improvements in such a way that capital is less
productive in its new location. A business is
induced by the promise of a subsidy to locate in
an otherwise less promising area within a
municipality. But other businesses that might be
attracted to locate near it are deterred by the
inferior location and instead go to another
municipality. The TIF has reduced grow^.
The additional
finding that growth is
slower outside the TIF
area of a municipality
than would be
expected reinforces
this "inefficient
relocation of
development"
explanation. When we
compared the non-TIF
area of a municipality
to a similar
municipality that did
not have a TIF, the
non-TIF area grew
more slowly. In other
words, TIF subsidies
might be helping
growth within the TIF
district, but they are
hurting growth outside
the district by a larger
amount
...policymakers
should revisit
the issue ofTIF
districts as
economic
development
tools and the
question of
whether other
local
governments
should have
authoritative
roles in the
decision to
create TIF
districts.
"
Recommendations
Because all local governments and their
residents are affected by the consequences of
municipal TIF districts, the results of this study
suggest that state and local policymakers should
revisit the issue ofTIF districts as economic
development tools and the question of whether
school districts and other local governments
should also have authoritative roles in the
decision to create TIF districts.
Richard Dye is the ErnestJohnson Professor of
Economics at Lake Forest College. David
Merriman is Professor ofEconomics at Loyola
University of Chicago. Both also are Adjunct
Professors at IGPA. The research summarized here
was published in the March 2000 edition of the
Journal of Urban Economics and a longer version
is available from IGPA as Working Paper No. 75.
The Working Paper is available on the IGPA web
site at www.igpa.uillinois.edu.
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Racial profiling and Illinois policy
Legislators can force an end to racist stops
By Cedric Herring
Recently, "racial profiling" - the discriminatory
practice by which police treat racial or ethnic
minority status as an indication of possible
criminaJity - has grabbed headlines and become
a public policy concern. In some areas, the
stopping of racial minorities by police for minor
traffic violations has become so commonplace
that it has become known as "driving while
black." Many citizens, especially whites who have
never experienced such treatment, find it hard to
believe that such discriminatory behavior by the
police exists. Nevertheless, there is clear and
convincing evidence of such patterns. In New
Jersey, according to a recent New York Times
report, the state's attorney general has released
internal state documents that show at least eight
out of every ten automobile searches carried out
by state troopers on the New Jersey Turnpike
over most of the last ten years were conducted on
vehicles driven by blacks and Hispanics.
Also, while some people think that such stops
are rare inconveniences, data from a 1999 Gallup
Survey suggests that more than four out of ten
African Americans report such experiences, and
nearly seven out often of those stopped report
being detained three or more times.
Racial profiling is not just another form of
discrimination against minorities. It often carries
the force of the state behind it, and therefore, is
even more repugnant. It is not just the haphazard
lawlessness of a few individual police officers that
act on their prejudices; rather, it is so systematic
that many critics point to it as an example of
**Racial profil-
ing... carries
the force of the
state behind it,
and therefore,
is even more
repugnant"
institutionalized discrimination. But perhaps most
disturbing about such practices is the fear that
they may be symptomatic of persisting racial
inequities in the criminal justice system.
This edition oi Policy ^^^^^^h^^i^hb^
Forum examines racial
profiling in Illinois and
elsewhere. It provides
an overview of racial
profiling and how it
operates, who is most
likely to be victimized
by such patterns,
where profiling has
been alleged to be most
prevalent, what data
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m
from the Illinois State
Police shows, why such practices happen, and
what can be done to bring an end to racial profil-
ing.
What is racial profiling and how does it woilt?
Some analysts suggest that racial profiling
became more prevalent when the "war on drugs"
was stepped up. Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) Special Agent Markonni developed
the first profile in the early 1970s. By 1979,
Markonni's drug courier profile was in use at
more than 20 airports. In the 1980s, skin color
became a major profile component. Black travel-
ers in the nation's airports found themselves the
subjects of frequent interrogations and baseless
searches by the DEA and the U.S. Customs
^1 IGPAUnwersity ofIllinois
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Service. These law enforcement practices soon
spread to train stations and bus terminals as well.
In 1986, a racially biased drug courier profile
was introduced to highway patrols by the DEA.
The technique, taught and encouraged by the
DEA, became instrumental in spreading the use
of pretext traffic stops. At about the same time,
the Florida Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles issued guidelines for troopers to
be suspicious of ethnic groups associated with the
drug trade. Traffic stops were initiated by the
state troopers using this overtly race-based
profile.
The use of racial profiling by the police has
been justified by claims that racial and ethnic
minorities commit most drug offenses. But in
1998, a study on U.S. drug policy issued by
Physician Leadership on National Drug Policy
(PLNDP) - a high-profile group of doctors includ-
ing high-ranking health officials from the Reagan,
Bush and Clinton administrations - concluded,
contrary to popular perceptions, that drug users
are not primarily members of minority racial and
ethnic groups. They found that illicit drug use
reaches across all strata of society, with affluent,
educated whites being the most likely drug users,
and the most likely to be addicted. In other words,
the basis for racial profiling is factually untrue.
Nevertheless, it becomes a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy: Because police look for illegal drugs mostly
among blacks and Hispanics, they find a higher
number of them v^th illicit substances. Therefore,
more minorities are arrested, prosecuted, con-
victed, and imprisoned. In particular, blacks
constitute 13 percent of the country's drug users;
37 percent of those arrested on drug charges; 55
percent of those convicted; and 74 percent of all
drug offenders sentenced to prison. These pat-
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terns reinforce the perception that drug offenses
are primarily committed by racial and ethnic
minorities.
One of the core principles of the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is that the
police cannot stop and detain people vdthout
some probable cause or reasonable suspicion that
those people are involved in criminal activity.
When the police use traffic stops against people of
color as a pretext to "fish" for evidence of wrong-
doing, they violate the spirit of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
As a more general concept, racial profiling may
be understood as the practice of defining a social
"...contrary to popular
perceptions, ...drug users are not
primarily members ofminority
racial and etiinic groups."
problem in racial terms - through indirect asso-
ciation. Once an issue is portrayed in racial terms,
the problem promotes distrust, racial animosities,
and makes it acceptable to target certain racial
groups for punitive actions. So, the link between
racial stereotypes and public policy is key. In
racial profiling by police, the link between stereo-
types and punitive actions is direct: Individual
officers act on racial stereotypes against racial
minorities, especially African Americans and
Hispanics.
Where does profiling occur, wiio is taigeted?
Nationvdde, blacks make up roughly 12 percent
of the population, and less than 10 percent of
motorists. Yet, it is estimated that they represent
more than 50 percent of those stopped for traffic
violations. But because of the discretionary
nature of most traffic stops, racial profiling is a
subtie form of discrimination that is difficult to
document in any particular incident. It is an act
that offers its perpetrators plausible "deniability."
It is easy to cover up by suggesting that any
particular act was just coincidentally linked to
race.
Just how widespread is racial profiling? Skin
color and other racial markers are apparentiy the
grounds for believing that a person is likely to
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Blacks and Hispanics as a percentage ofmotorists in various police districts and as a percentage of
motorists stopped on Illinois h^ways bydn^miits in those districts, 1987-1997
District Counties included
Hacks as a percentage of: Hispanics as a percentage of:
Motorists in
tiie district
Motorists stopped
by drug unit
Motorists in
the district
IVIotorists stopped
by drug unit
4
Cook 23.8 61.4 11.8 8.0
5
Kendall, Grundy, Will
8.4 27.5 4.7 17.4
6
Livingston, McLean,
DeWrtt 4.1 23.6 4.2 17.4
7
Rock Island, Mercer, Henry,
Knox 5.3 14.1 3.6
11.3
9
Mason, Cass, Menard,
Logan, Moran, Sangamon,
Christian
1.2 24.7 0.1 22.6
10
Champaign, Vermillion,
Piatt, Douglas, Edgar, Coles
Macon, Moultry, Shelby
6.6 30.9 1.1 28.4
11
Bond, Clinton, Madison, St.
Clair, Monroe
13.6 23.3 1.1 28.4
12
Clark, Cumberland,
Crawford, Jasper, Clay,
Effingham, Fayett, Marion,
1.2 12.5 0.4 34.1
13
Jefferson, Washington,
Randolph, Peny, Jackson,
Franklin, Williamson
4.5 18.9 0.8 23.8
17
Bureau, Putnam, La Salle 0.8 11.4 2.4 39.2
18
Montgomery, Macoupin,
Greene, Jersey, Calhoun
1.0 14.0 0.4 13.3
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have committed a crime. As mentioned eariier,
when asked in a 1999 Gallup Survey whether they
had ever been stopped just because of their race
or ethnic background, more than four out of ten
African Americans (42 percent) reported that they
had been wrongfully stopped. This compares with
less than one out of 15 whites (6 percent. In the
most extreme cases, no person of color is immune
from this kind of handling, irrespective of their
socioeconomic status, age, the type of car they
drive, or their diligence in obeying the law. But,
young black men in particular believe they are
singled out. More than 70 percent of young black
men (between the ages of 18 and 34) believe that
they have been stopped by police because of their
race or ethnic background.
In Illinois, there have been several highly
publicized cases where racial profiling has been
charged. In Highland Park, which had no African
Americans on its 60-member police force, 17
police officers filed a suit claiming the department
encouraged racial profiling, that department
supervisors used racial slurs on the job, and that
officers were encouraged to target blacks and
Hispanics for traffic stops. In addition, the suit
charged that the Highland Park Police
Department engaged in manipulation of crime
statistics to cover over a racially biased pattern of
enforcement. Under a federal consent decree that
stemmed from the lawsuit. Highland Park
voluntarily agreed to document police actions for
the next five years, train officers to avoid
discriminatory practices, handle citizen
complaints under new rules, and take other
actions to keep police from unfairly targeting
racial minorities.
In Mount Prospect, which had three Hispanic
and no African American officers in its
81-member department, a fired Hispanic officer
filed similar charges. The suit sought class-action
status on behalf of Hispanic motorists targeted
under a policy of "stopping, detaining, and issuing
traffic tickets to persons on the basis of race and
without legally sufficient cause," to boost arrest
totals. A federal jury found that department guilty
of discrimination and awarded $1.2 million.
Further, the judge said that because of the
testimony that came out during the trial, the
charges of racial profiling warranted federal
investigation, and the U.S. Attorney's Office
recently launched such an investigation.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of
Illinois filed suit against the Illinois State Police
(ISP) on the grounds that they were singling out
black and Hispanic motorists for highway drug
searches. The ACLU submitted to the court
several analyses on state troopers assigned to a
drug interdiction program called "Operation
Valkyrie." In this instance, Valkyrie officers
recorded the race of
those stopped and ^^mh^^^^^h^^h^
searched. Analyses of
the data showed that ". ..\dlile Hispatl-
while Hispanics ics comprise
comprise less than 8 less than 8 per-
cent ofthe Illi-
nois popula-
tion... they com-
prise approxi-
mate^30 per-
cent ofthe mo-
torists stopped
by ISP drug
interdiction
officers."
percent of the Illinois
population and take
fewer than 3 percent
of the automobile
trips in Illinois, they
comprise
approximately 30
percent of the
motorists stopped by
ISP drug interdiction
officers for
discretionary
offenses such as
failure to signal a lane ^"i^^^^"*"^^^^^^
change or driving less
than five miles per hour over the speed Umit.
The table on page 3 presents data from
Illinois State Police field reports that show the
disproportionately high percentage of blacks and
Hispanics who were stopped on Illinois highways.
This data suggests that there are several places in
Illinois where disproportionate traffic stops of
blacks and Hispanics is fairly routine. Thus,
African American and Hispanic residents may
alter their driving habits by avoiding places like
all-white suburbs, where they fear police
harassment for looking "out of place."
What can be done to end racial profiling?
Recent court decisions have granted the police
virtually unlimited authority to stop and search
any vehicle they want. Unfortunately, such stops
disproportionately fall on the backs of people of
color. To end the practice of racial profiling, light
must be shed on the practice and pressure must
be applied to those who engage in it. There are
several modest steps that can be taken to reduce
the incidence of racial profiling:
• End the use of pretext stops as a crime-
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fighting tactic.
•Restrict the use of vehicle searches by police
for which there is no probable cause other than
the racial profile of the occupants.
•Pass state and federal legislation to collect
information on racially-motivated traffic stops.
•Withhold funding from policing agencies that
repeatedly show patterns of disproportionately
stopping racial and ethnic minorities.
One of the easiest ways to curtail racial profil-
ing while documenting the practice would be to
require police officers
"...racial
profiling is a
discriminatory
act being
carried out by
those who are
sworn to
protect"
to keep a contact list
that includes the name,
race, and reason for
stopping any individual
not given a citation.
Also, individuals
stopped but not cited
should be given a
receipt as proof of the
contact, as audit trails
tend to keep people
more honest about their
behavior. ^^ma^^^mmm^^^m^
At the federal level, several congressmen have
called for the passage of laws that would require
the attorney general to study the role race plays in
police traffic stops. One such bill, the Traffic
Stops Statistics Act, calls for the U.S. Attorney
General's office to conduct a study of routine
traffic stops by the police. The study would
include the races and ages of the people stopped,
the alleged violations involved, whether and how
searches of vehicles were conducted, the reasons
for such searches, and whether citations were
issued or arrests made in conjunction with the
stops. Passage of such legislation may be the first
step in ending the use of traffic stops for non-
traffic purposes, usually drug interdiction.
In Illinois, similar bills have been introduced in
the General Assembly. Like the federal legisla-
tion, these bills would require law enforcement
agencies in the state to gather and report data
about the race and ethnicity of all motorists they
stop for traffic violations - whether police issue a
citation or warning. The information about traffic
stops would be collected at the county level and
reported to the Illinois Secretary of State, whose
office would analyze the data for trends and make
a report about evidence of racial profiling to the
General Assembly.
Perhaps more importantly, the next step for
both the Illinois and the federal government
needs to be ensuring that taxpayer money is not
used by policing agencies to carry out racial
profiling. Agencies that continue to disproportion-
ately stop racial and ethnic minorities should have
their appropriations linked to their performance.
Also, as the lawsuits over this issue continue to
mount, defense of such practices becomes an
expensive proposition. Departments charged with
such contemptuous activities should have to rely
on their own resources and not receive additional
allocations from the state. Such budgetary deter-
rence may act as a reminder that racial profiling is
a discriminatory act being carried out by those
who are sworn to protect and serve rather than
harass and humiliate.
Cedric Herring is a professor in the Department
of Sociology at the University ofIllinois at Chicago
and in the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs at the University ofIllinois. In addition, he
is a faculty associate at the Irving B. Harris Gradu-
ate School ofPublic Policy Studies at the University
of Chicago.
His areas ofinterest and expertise include social
policy, laborforce issues and policies, stratification
and inequality, and the sociology ofblack Ameri-
cans.
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The Institute of Government and Public Affairs continuing education programs that help practitio-
serves society by helping to improve public ners understand and address the issues they face,
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Invasion USA:
Nonnative species are an immediate tiireat
^"^
By May Berenbaum
Of the many forms of global environmental
change afflicting the planet, one of the most insidious
is the movement of invasive species of plants, animals
and microbes from native to nonnative areas. The
economic and ecological impacts of global biological
change are concrete, immediate and significant.
Invasive species, also called alien, exotic, nonna-
tive, or nonindigenous species, are species that are
found in areas other than where they evolved. Al-
though some species may invade under their own
power, such as via migration, or by natural means, such
as by floating on debris on ocean current, the vast
majority are relocated by human interference. Be-
cause introduced species rarely encounter the range
of natural enemies in new habitats that can be found in
their places of origin, they often increase in numbers
quickly and pose a threat to native species. Although
the U.S. government recognizes the threat posed by
invasive species, its response to this biological crisis
has been tepid at best.
This article reviews the problems presented by
invasive species, describes the failures of existing
policy, and makes recommendations for changes in
policy to protect the nation from the environmental
and economic losses caused by invasive species.
Problems presented by Invasive species
Invasive species can cause ecological and eco-
nomic disruption both directly, by reducing yields of
crops and livestock, and indirectly, by out-competing
and displacing native species. A recent study estimates
that damage and control costs associated with
nonindigenous species (NIS) in the U.S. exceed $137
billion each year. Alien species may cause this damage
as consumers, as competitors, or as carriers of plant
and animal diseases.
Public health is affected by alien species as well.
Non-indigenous species provide a means for introduc-
ing exotic diseases, as in the recent outbreaks ofWest
Nile Virus (introduced in some instances by a recently
discovered NIS) in New York.
One of the major indirect effects of nonindigenous
species is the alteration of ecological communities. By
way of their unchecked reproduction, they can reduce
the range of native species or even replace them
altogether (in turn affecting species in the community
that depend on the native species that have been
replaced) . The
nonindigenous w^mi^^m^^^mi^^^mmmm
wetlands weed purple
loosestrife has been
increasing its range
by 115,000 hectares
annually, altering
wetland composition,
reducing populations
of more than 40
native plant species
and presenting a
threat to wildlife
dependent on those
native plants. NIS can
also disrupt ecologi-
cal relationships
within an ecological wtma^^^mmm^m^^^mmm
community. The
Argentine ant,
accidentally introduced into the continental U.S. and
Hawaii, is thought to be responsible for the decline or
even disappearance of several native ant species. TTiis
displacement has serious consequences for plant
community composition. Many plants, particularly
'The economic
and ecological
impacts of
global
biological
change are
concrete,
immediate and
significant."
^IGPA \li The Environmental Council
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early spring perennials such as violets, depend on
particular ant species for dispersal of their seeds and
Argentine ants are poor substitutes for the species
they displace.
Yet another way nonindigenous species (NIS) can
present problems to native species is by interbreeding
with them and eroding their genetic integrity. Concern
is growing over the long-term effect of the introduction
ofAtlantic salmon into Pacific Northwest fisheries and
the impact of interbreeding on the integrity of native
West Coast salmon species. Atlantic salmon that had
escaped fi-om farms in British Columbia constituted
less than 0.004 percent of the catch in 1996. Their
numbers, however, appear to be increasing, as is their
range. With interbreeding, the genetic integrity and
the very existence ofWest Coast salmon species are at
risk.
Altogether, economic and ecological impacts of
NIS are enormous; in one sense, they may actually be
incalculable. In 1993, the Office ofTechnology Assess-
ment pegged the estimated cumulative economic
losses due to only 79 selected invasive species at
almost $96 billion from 1906 to 1991; a worst-case
scenario estimate for future economic losses fi-om only
15 selected species exceeded $134 billion. More than
40 percent of the species considered as threatened or
endangered under the Endangered Species Act are at
risk largely due to incursions ofnonindigenous species,
which compete with or prey on them.
For all these reasons, there is considerable
interest within the scientific community in profiling
invasive species. Efforts to characterize "invasibility,"
however, have had limited success. Invasive species
tend to be widespread and abundant in their native
area; possess high fertility and short generation times;
function in a wide range of conditions; possess strong
dispersal capability; exhibit high genetic variability;
have the capacity for asexual reproduction; have the
capacity to synchronize life cycle with new habitat
requirements; and have an association with humans.
But perhaps the most reliable generalization is that no
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generalization will allow for the prediction of invasive-
ness of a particular species.
The histoiy of invasion
Although certain life characteristics are shared by
many invasive species, considerable variation exists
among groups of organisms. In part, this variation
reflects the interaction between biology and human
culture. Small size, for example, is a hallmark of
invasive species, not only because it is associated with
high reproductive potential and thus superior coloniz-
ing ability, but also because it greatly facilitates passing
Estimated annual costs associated with
nonindigenous insects and otiier
arthropods in the U.S.
Type of organism Total costs
(X $1 million)
Structural pests 1,000
Forest pests 2,111
Crop pests 14,400
Lawn,garden, turf pests 1,500
Livestock 2,000
Source: BioScience 2000
through checkpoints and borders and avoiding
detection. Although a small proportion of
nonindigenous species arrive on their own power - boll
weevils crossed the border fi-om Mexico, and currents
may have moved some small aerial plankton to new
habitats - the vast majority of aliens arrived in the U.S.
with human assistance. The history ofhuman settle-
ment of the New World is faithfully recorded in the
identities of species accidentally (and sometimes
deliberately) carried along as a consequence of
commerce or agriculture. Thus, to understand
invasibility, it is necessary to understand patterns of
human movement, trade, and even, in the case of
deliberate introductions, human psychology.
The long travel time between the U.S. and the rest
of the world served as protection against invasion until
the 19th century. Notwithstanding, immigrants
brought their household goods with them and inad-
vertently brought along stowaways, some ofwhich
survived the hardships of travel. The yellow fever
mosquito arrived in the Western hemisphere fi-om
Africa in the 17th century aboard slave ships engaged
in the Triangle trade, breeding in the water barrels
brought on board ship. Shipboard ballast, often soil,
was the source ofmany species of ground-dwelling
insects. Packing material, too, was a source of biologi-
cal contamination - Hessian flies, a scourge ofwheat
crops, were thought to have arrived in straw accompa-
nying Hessian soldiers coming to aid the British during
the Revolutionary War. U.S. crop plants are almost
entirely nonindigenous species - stocks from Europe
often were accompanied by pest species.
In the 19th century, technological innovations
greatly enhanced the rate at which materials could
move across oceans. Among the most significant was
steamship travel, which greatly decreased trans-
oceanic travel time in comparison with sailing vessels.
Another was the invention of the Wardian case, an air-
tight sealed portable greenhouse created expressly for
housing and transporting biological specimens. The
Victorian rage for exotica meant that hundreds of
European plants were shipped to the US as ornamen-
tals - accompanied by thriving scale insects, seed
parasites, plant bugs, and other insects with concealed
eggs or feeding stages. As methods of transportation
decreased travel time, the rate of incursion increased.
Ak travel reduced the mortality of stowaways even
further
Finally, cultural practices contribute to invasions.
Species often introduced deliberately for biological
control ofweeds or insect pests, for pollination, or for
dung management have, on occasion, had unforeseen
impacts on native species. A thistle weevil deliberately
introduced to control European musk thistles, for
example, has infested native prairie thistles, and
ladybugs imported to control pest aphids have devas-
tated populations of aphids of no economic importance.
One such ladybug, introduced to control pest aphids,
appears to have displaced native ladybugs throughout
its range. Even the western honey bee, imported as
pollinator and honey producer, has, in its 300-year
history in North America, had adverse impacts,
including suppression of local pollinators and, following
the incursion of Africanized honey bees, threats to
human health through aggressive behavior. Ironically,
its survival today is threatened by the accidental
importation of two species of parasitic mites from
Eurasia, which have devastated wild colonies.
Some deliberate introductions are biologically
incomprehensible in retrospect. Gypsy moths were
brought from Europe in an ill-conceived effort to start a
local silk industry; in a recent 20-year period this
species destroyed $16 million worth of trees. Several
birds now established as pests, including starlings and
English sparrows, were introduced so that U.S.
residents could experience species mentioned in
Shakespeare's writings.
The 20th century has seen an acceleration of
accidental importation and establishment, a trend that
will almost certainly continue into the 21st century.
Globalization of trade greatly increases the number of
sources of NIS. For example, U.S. trade with China has
increased astronomically in recent years, to $73 billion
in goods each year, and the number of insects found in
materials imported from China has increased with it,
from 1 percent of all interceptions in 1987 to 20
percent in 1996. In many cases, use by Chinese
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exporters of poor-quality insect-infested lumber for
constructing solid-wood packing materials and for
dunnage - tree trunks used to cushion cargo - has
proved to be a major source of tree-feeding NIS.
Not surprisingly, coastal areas are more vulnerable
than others. Pacific Northwest and southeastern U.S.
seaports are sites of frequent interceptions. Ihe state
of Illinois, however, is particularly vulnerable to
nonindigenous insect introduction and serves as an
excellent within-continent model for studies of
invasibility. The IllinoisWaterway System in the
Chicago area comprises several natural rivers and
interconnecting channels directly linking the Great
Lakes and the Mississippi River basins. These basins
involve parts of 30 states and two Canadian provinces,
so the potential impact, both environmental and
economic, of invasive species is considerable. The
zebra mussel, for example, infests almost the full
lengths of the Illinois and Mississippi River, and new
recruits from Lake Michigan repopulate these two
rivers every year. New threats via this route include
the round goby and the African zooplankter. Air traffic
through Dlinois also favors invasions. O'Hare airport,
Estimated annual costs associated witli
Individual pests
Name of organism Total costs
(X$l million)
Imported fire ant 1,000
Gypsy moth H
European elm bark beetle 100
Formosan termite 1,000
Source: BioScience 2000
the busiest in the U.S., is a site of frequent intercep-
tions. In recent years, increasing containerization of
cargo has made inspection more difficult and allows
material to move to the nation's midsection with
greater ease. A recent, dramatic example involves the
Asian long-horned beetle, a wood-boring species that
causes extensive damage to a wide range of deciduous
trees, particularly in urban environments. These
beetles probably arrived in the Chicago area in solid
wood packing materials from China.
inadequate policy responses
In some ways, invasive species are the most easily
managed form of global change. The government,
through well-enforced laws, has a mechanism to keep
out undesirable species fairly effectively, at modest or
at least reasonable cost, if such laws are enacted and
appropriate effort invested in enforcing them. This has
not, however, been a long-standing American tradition;
the United States has generally failed to attempt such
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management. TTie U.S. was among the last of the
major economic powers to enact quarantine laws.
Quarantine laws that do exist are largely ineffectually
enforced. The Federal Plant Quarantine Act of 1912
authorizes the U.S.D.A to regulate movements of
plants, generally agricultural species, in order to
prevent incursions by insect or microbial pests
injurious to them. The Federal Seed Act of 1939
prohibits importation of seed contaminated with
noxious weeds; the Federal Plant Pest Act regulates
interstate transport and importation of agricultural
pests; and the Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974
authorizes the Secretary ofAgriculture to prevent
importation ofweeds determined to have negative
impacts on agriculture, public health, navigation, and
natural biotic resources. TTie list ofweeds designated
as noxious under this last act includes 94 species. With
much of the emphasis of previous legislation on
protecting agriculture, in 1977 PresidentJames Carter
signed Executive Order 1 1987, calling on federal
agencies to act to prevent introductions of exotic
species into natural areas within federal lands and
waters. This legislation still leaves vulnerable natural
ecosystems outside the federal system.
The Lacey Act, enacted in 1900 and amended in
1981, restricts movements of only a tiny fraction of
potentially dangerous immigrant species. This act
allows the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to exclude
species in two families offish, 13 genera of mammals,
13 genera of shellfish, and 6 species of birds and
reptiles. It is written as a "dirty" list; species are
recognized as problematical only after they have
caused problems, either here or elsewhere. Moreover,
adding species to the list can take years, particularly if
listing a species conflicts with the economic well-being
of a special interest group. Moreover, it does not apply
consistently to interstate transport within the U.S. The
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
,
the branch of the USDA charged with policing ports of
entry, can regulate interstate commerce only when a
quarantine has been imposed; thus, interstate com-
merce of species on the Lacey Act list is permissible,
so invasive species may get an assist from human
agents in colonizing North America.
Internationally, the U. S. has been slow to act as
well. Although the U.S. was a signatory to Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention in 1972, the
Convention on Biological Diversity drawn up in 1992 at
a United Nations environmental summit has been
ratified by 153 nations, not including the U. S. (signed
by President Clinton but not yet passed by Congress)
.
This convention requires a commitment by signatory
nations to prevent entry of and eradicate NIS where
they threaten natural systems.
Within the past decade, the level ofconcern
nationally has increased. The U.S. Nonindigenous
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990
was the federal government's effort to stem the
invasion of zebra mussels and other NIS in the Great
Lakes; it created an Aquatic Nuisance Species Task
Force to work out a plan for controlling exotic aquatic
species; it established the National Ballast Water
Control Program, authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to
insure that vessels entering the Great Lakes either be
free of ballast or retain ballast throughout their voyage
through the Great Lakes system; and it authorized the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine
Fisheries Service to prevent infroductions of exotic
aquatic species. This act was reauthorized in 1996 as
the U. S. National Invasive Species Act, which also
expanded the ballast provisions to all U.S. ports.
Within the last year, two significant policy changes
were instituted. On Feb. 2, 1999, President Clinton
signed Executive Order 13112, to "prevent the infro-
duction of invasive species and provide for their control
and to minimize the economic, ecological, and human
health impacts that invasive species cause," allocating
$28 million to combat alien species and to create an
Interagency Invasive Species Council charged with
developing a national Invasive Species Management
plan. Secretary of State Bruce Babbitt created the
Invasive Weed Awareness Coalition in 1999.
Recommendations
There are several policy changes that should be
made to ensure that U.S. natural and economic re-
sources are safeguarded from future harm by invasive
species. These include changing from a "dirty list" to a
"clean list" mentality, ensuring better enforcement
policies that include educating the general public as to
why invasive species represent a threat to the eco-
nomic and ecological well-being of the nation.
1. "Clean list"
Despite the new attention given to invasive species,
the basic U. S. philosophy has continued to reflect a
"dirty list" mentality. This approach is cumbersome and
ineffectual. For example, listing an invasive eucalypt
that has had devastating effects on the integrity of the
Everglades in Florida took five years to accomplish,
during which time its range continued to expand. Other
nations -Australia and New Zealand, which as "island"
nations have been particularly hard-hit by NIS - have
adopted a different legislative strategy. They use a
"clean list" - a list of species specifically permitted for
importation, species known not to be invasive. The
"innocent until proven guilty" philosophy regarding
importations has proved an ecologically and economi-
cally costly one; alternative approaches at this point,
although challenging from a regulatory standpoint,
seem sensible from a scientific standpoint.
2. Well-enforced laws
Well-enforced laws provide one way to keep out
undesirable species. But American enforcement of
even its relatively weak laws is anemic at best. The U.S.
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, or APHIS,
is charged with protecting U.S. borders from invasion
by foreign pests. But the odds favor the invaders, by
sheer force of number. In 1996, only 1,350 APHIS
quarantine officers were responsible for inspecting
410,000 planes and 52,000 ships. Altogether, unautho-
rized travelers were intercepted 48,483 times; tens of
thousands more organisms most likely went undetec-
ted and successfully entered the United States. This
agency has been chronically under-funded, resulting in
millions of dollars being spent on cleanup efforts after
incursions take place. TTie recent discovery of Asian
longhorn beetles in Chicago and New York, for
example, has already led to eradication efforts costing
in excess of $10 million. To enforce these laws effec-
tively will require more staff and more funding than the
government has to date been willing to commit.
Unfortunately, failure to do so in the past has proved to
be prohibitively costly and there is every reason to
expect that, with increasing globalization, costs of
incursions will skyrocket
3. Education effort
While it may be difficult to seal up all of the cracks
through which invasive species gain entrance, there
are major openings that can be closed voluntarily
Attitudes have to change. We Americans are very fond
of nonindigenous introduced species - we eat them,
play with them, take them for walks, and plant them in
gardens and admire them. Half of the 300 most
invasive weeds in the U.S. were initially introduced as
ornamentals. Ornamentals may have become to a large
degree dangerous luxuries. It's time for Americans to
develop an appreciation for native species and reduce
importations and introductions to absolute economic
necessities. Just as with the war on drugs, reducing
demand is an important part of the battle. State and
local governments can play a role by incorporating
invasion biology into the curriculum at both primary
and secondary levels; the federal government can play
a role through its partnership and influence with land-
grant universities.
It is also important for people to respect the law -
many introductions are the result of thoughtless acts
by people who are either ignorant of the law or feel
that they are above the law. Illegal stocking of exotic
game fish threatens native species, and importation
and planting of noxious weeds occurs routinely in many
parts of the country. Punishment for deliberate
releases of invasive species should be as swift and
severe as it is for corporate polluters. In 1990, APHIS
inspectors at U.S. ports of entry discovered over a
million violations and levied $743,345 in fines - less
than a dollar per violation. Such fines cannot be a
disincentive for flouting the law, and the consequences
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can be devastating. In some ways, releases of NIS can
wreak greater environmental havoc than chemical
pollution, in that oil or chemical spills cannot reproduce
or increase in magnitude after release. By the same
token, proposed introductions should be permitted
only after potential environmental impacts ai-e assessed
Closing Thoughts
The U.S. is a world leader in the realm of exotic
invasion—there are more NIS established in North
America than on any other continent Over 6,600
nonnative species have been introduced since Euro-
pean settlers first
colonized the conti- mmi^a^^m^mmmi^ma^^
nent; approximately 5%
ofthe U.S. continental "We Americans
flora and fauna is
^^^^ ^f
nonnative. And the rate
.
;
of mvasion appears to nonindlgenOUS
be increasing. What is introduced
at stake is more than gpecies - we
economic damage; ^
.,
Americans stand to eat them, play
lose forever a signifi- with them, take
cantfractionofthe
^^^ j^j. ^^jj^g
North American biota j.i
that is our natural and plant them
heritage. Although it is jn gardens and
true that the science of
^^^^^ ^^^.
ecology has yet to
establish a reliable
framework of principles ^^^^^^^^^^^
for identifying and
controlling NIS, it is
also true that simply applying principles ofcommon
sense about where species belong can make a vast
amount of progress. A greater appreciation for our own
native biota will go a long way toward reducing ill-
advised deliberate introductions of NIS and preventing
accidental escapes.
May Berenbaum is head ofthe Department of
Entymology at the University ofIllinois at Urbana-
Champaign. At the UI, she is a member ofthe Center
for Advanced Study, a Jubilee professor and holds a
Swanlund Chair She also is a member ofthe National
Academy of Science. In 1999 she won the E. 0. Wilson
NaturalistAwardfrom the American Society ofNatu-
ralists.
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Airline alliances benem consumers
By Jan K- Brueckner
As international airline traffic has expanded in recent
years, a new development has swept the industry -
extensive cooperation among international carriers in
the provision of service. This cooperation, which can
include pricing, has raised the red flag of potential
price-fixing for government officials, regulators and
consumers. Economic theory, however, predicts that
airline cooperation should lead to lower, not higher,
fares for the interline passenger, who must travel on
two airlines to reach his or her destination. Are
interline fares lower as a result of airline cooperation? K
so, what are the implications for government
regulatory decisions that permit cooperative behavior?
This article explores these two questions.
The most visible form of cooperation is found in the
international airline alliances that link U.S. carriers to
partners in other countries. These alliances are
designed to offer the international passenger a
"seamless" travel experience by minimizing some of
the inconveniences of traditional interline, or multi-
carrier, trips. Schedule coordination by the alliance
partners, along with gate proximity at hub airports,
eases passenger connections between the carriers.A
merger of the partners' fi-equent flier programs
typically reinforces these conveniences.
In those cases where the alliance partners enjoy
antitrust immunity, cooperation extends into the realm
of pricing. With immunity, the partners can collaborate
m the determination of fares for interline trips in a
fashion that was impossible under traditional pricing
arrangements.
Cooperation is also widespread among carriers that are
notformal alliance partners. Such cooperation arises
through aweb of international codesharing
arrangements, which are common among alliance
partners but also link many non-allied carriers. With
codesharing, an interline trip is ticketed as if it occurred on
a single carrier. In support ofa codesharing agreement,
carriersmay adjust schedules and take other steps to
foster seamless travel, just as iftheywere formal alliance
partners. In addition, codeshare trips are usually priced
with greater flexibility than under traditional arrangements.
However, outright collaboration in pricing is not allowed in
the absence of antitrust immunity.
Because international air travel plays a crucial role in
globalization oftiie world economy, it is important to
quantify the impact of tiie new patterns of cooperation
among international carriers. Quantifying the effect on
passenger convenience is likely to be difficult, but the
impact ofcooperation on international airfares is more
easily measured.
Theory
The theory offare determination for interline trips is
easily explained. Consider the airline routes shown in
Figure 1, which represents part ofa larger network. In this
hypothetical example, United provides service between
Chicago and Frankfurt, while Lufthansa provides service
between FranWurt and Athens. Togetiier, tiie airlines
provide interline service fi-om Chicago to Athens.
Suppose the airlines are not able to cooperate in setting
the interline fare for tiie tiip fi-om Chicago to Athens. In
this case, each airline will
For more, see:
Working Paper #83
at the IGPAweb site:
www.igpa.uillinois.edu
decide on the payment it
requires to carry an
interline passenger for its
portion ofthe trip. United
determines the required
payment for carrying the ,
passenger between Chicago and Frankfiort, while
Lufthansa determineshow much it requires to carry the
passenger the rest ofthe way, from Frankfiirt to Athens.
Tnese payments can be called "subfares." The total
interline fare for tiie passenger comes fi-om adding
United's subfare to Lufthansa's.
^1 IGVKUniversity ofIllinois
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Figure 1: Interline route
Frankfurt
United
K
aChicago
In setting its subfare in the absence of cooperation,
each airline ignores the effect of its choice on the other
For example, suppose United contemplates a slightly
higher subfare. Tliis will raise the overall fare, which in
turn will cut traffic in the market slightly. But since United
is earning more on each passenger, it may come out ahead
even though traffic is lower. While a higher subfare may
be in United's interest, it unambiguously hurts Lufthansa.
The reason is that Lufthansa's subfare has not changed,
so it is earning the same amount on fewer passengers.
Thus, the increase in United's subfare reduces
Lufthansa's profit. United has no incentive to take this
negative effect into account The same argument applies
to Lufthansa's choice of its own subfare.
In contrast, suppose United and Lufthansa can
cooperate in setting the overall fare for the Chicago-to-
Athens flight. Cooperation means that they set the fare
so as to maximize their combined profit fi-om the
market. Subfares are chosen with an eye on total, not
individual, profit. Now, United takes account of the fact
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Lufthansa
Athens^
that an increase in its own subfare is bad for Lufthansa,
and vice versa. As a result, each airline lowers its
subfare, and the overall interline fare falls relative to the
non-cooperative case. Thus, airline cooperation leads to
a reduction in interline fares.
The cooperative case corresponds well to the
situation of alliance partners operating with antitrust
immunity. Immunity allows full collaboration in the
choice of interline fares, which the carriers would set so
as to maximize joint profit from the various markets
where they provide interline service.
Non-cooperative behavior underlies the traditional
pricing method for international trips, which uses fares set
by the International AirTransport Association (lATA).
Greater cooperation in fare determination is possible
under "special prorate" agreements, which underlie most
codesharing pacts and also govern alliance pricing in the
absence of antitrust immunity However, such agreements
do not involve the full collaboration in pricing that is
possible under antitrust immunity.
The theory predicts that the lowest interline fares will
be charged by alliance partners operating with antitrust
immunity, who act cooperatively. Higher fares will be
charged by carrierswho lack antitrust immunity and rely
instead on special prorate agreements. Such carriers
include unimmunized alliance partners (who may or may
not codeshare) and non-allied carriers with a codesharing
agreement. Finally, the highest fares should be observed
when all these forms ofcollaboration (immunity,
codesharing, and alliance membership) are absent, with
the resulting fares corresponding to LATA fares.
Does airline cooperation reduce interline fares?
To test these predictions, data from the U.S.
Department ofTransportation's Passenger Origin-
Destination Survey were used. The database contains
thousands of airline itineraries, each ofwhich consists
of a sequence of airports along with the identities of the
carriers providing service from one airport to the next.
The operating carrier for each segment is indicated
along with the ticketed carrier, allowing codeshare
itineraries to be identified. The dollar fare for the
itinerary is shown, along with the fare class.
To focus on the months of high international ti-avel,
the third quarter of 1999 was used. For this quarter,
the survey contains slightly more than 3 million
records, and about 750,000 of these represent
itineraries involving at least one non-U.S. airport. In
order to focus on common types of interline trips with
foreign endpoints, a number of restrictions were applied
to the data. The resulting sample has 54,687
observations, with each showing a different
international itinerary (a particular route and carrier
combination) along with the average fare paid by
passengers on the itinerary These itineraries
represent ti-avel in 17,518 distinct international city-pair
markets, each of which has a U.S. endpoint.
Although the interline fare depends on the extent of
airline cooperation, as explained above, other variables
matter as well. These include the distance of the trip,
the size of the city-pair market (as measured by the
populations of the endpoint cities) , whether the ticket is
business-class or coach, the level of competition in the
city-pair market, the world region containing the non-
U.S. endpoint, the direction of ti-avel (either to or from
the U.S.) , and the carriers used.
The main variables of interest, however, are the three
airline cooperation measures. TTie first indicates whether
the itinerary involves codesharing between the two
carriers. Codesharing occurs when the operating and
ticketed carriers differ for one or more route segments.
The second cooperation measure indicates whether the
itinerary's carriers belonged to one ofthe four major
alliances in existence in the summer of 1999. For this
period, theWINGS alliance (whose name has not yet been
officially adopted) consisted ofNorthwest, KLM, Alitalia,
and Continental. The STAR alliance consisted of United,
Lufthansa, SAS, Air Canada, Varig, Thai Airways, Ansett
Australia, and AirNew Zealand. The ONEWORLD
alliance consisted ofAmerican, British Airways, Canadian,
Qantas, and Cathay Pacific. TTie ATLANTIC
EXCELLENCE alliance consisted of Delta, Swissair,
Sabena, and Austrian Airlines. Note tiiat later in 1999,
Delta withdrew from this alliance, linking instead with Air
France.
The third cooperation measure indicates whether
the two carriers for the itinerary enjoyed antitrust
immunity. As of the third quarter of 1999, the following
carrier pairs, all of which were alliance members, had
immunity: Northwest-KLM, United-Lufthansa, United-
SAS, United-Air Canada, American-Canadian, Delta-
Swissair, Delta-Sabena, and Delta-Austrian.
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The data show that airiine cooperation leads to lower
interline fares, confirming the predictions of the theory
By itself, codesharing by the itinerary's carriers leads
to a 7 percent reduction in the fare. Alliance
membership by itself reduces the fare by 4 percent.
Antitrust immunity leads to a much larger fare
reduction of 16 percent. These individual effects can be
summed to arrive at a total effect. For example, if the
carriers for the itinerary are alliance partners who
enjoy antiti-ust immunity and engage in codesharing,
then the fare would be 27 percent lower (4 -^ 16 + 7)
than if none of these elements of cooperation were
present. The fare reduction for unimmunized alliance
partners who codeshare would be 11 percent (4 + 7).
Note that if alliance partnership is removed, leaving
simple codesharing, this reduction falls to 7 percent,
while if codesharing is removed, leaving just alliance
membership, the reduction falls to 4 percent.
Conclusion
Tlie analysis shows that, when combined, the three
forms of airline cooperation (codesharing, alliance
membership, and antiti-ust immunity) lead to a substantial
27 percent reduction in interline fares. Tliis conclusion
shows tiiat, in addition to enjoying the convenience gains
made possible by airline cooperation, interline passengers
reap substantial benefits in the realm of pricing, paying
substantially lower fares as a resuk of cooperative
behavior. Government regulators at the DOT, who must
approve codesharing arrangements between carriers as
well as requests for antitrust immunity, should take these
price benefits into account in their decisions.
It should be noted that tiiis analysis does not consider
anotiier important group of alliance passengers: those
making nonstop trips between international gateway
airports using a single partner airline. Some observers
believe that airline cooperation may cause fares for tiiese
gateway passengers to rise rather than fall, a negative
outcome tiiat would tend to offset the gains for interline
passengers. Higher fares are expected because alliance
partiiers often provide overlapping service in gateway city-
pair markets (flying, in effect side by side on such routes)
,
and cooperation in this situation may be anticompetitive.
As a result of such concerns, the antitrust immunity
application filed by American Airlines and British Airways
generated substantial controversy TTie application was
deniedbytiieDOTinl999.
Previous research using 1997 data showed that
overlapping alliance service did not have a statistically
significant impact on gateway fares. This conclusion
suggests that the expected anticompetitive effect in
gateway markets (and the associated losses to
passengers) may not be present despite the concerns
of regulators.
Jan K. Brueckner is professor in the Department of
Economics and the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs at the University ofIllinois.
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Environmental problems and policy
Speculation on the future of environmental problems and regulation
By Paul R. Portney
All forecasting is fraught with risk of future
embarrassment, but environmental forecasts may be
among the diciest of all. In 1982, the Scientific
Forecasting and Trends Staff of the Environmental
Protection Agency's Office of Research and
Development commissioned a quite reputable
consulting company to undertake an "environmental
foresight study to help the EPA anticipate future
environmental problems and recognize emerging
trends. The study report was completed in late 1984.
Among other things, it identified the ten highest
priority environmental problems in the years to come,
as well as a group of problems of "second order
importance" - some thought to have been serious at
the time, others viewed merely as potential problems.
Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, or global climate
change, as it is now known, did not make the top ten.
Nor was it identified as a problem of second order
importance. Rather, it was identified as a potential
second order problem, the effects of which "are
unlikely, to be important by 2020."
The reason for remembering this prediction, of
course, is not to single out this particular set of authors.
To be fair to the authors of the report, even many of
those greatiy concerned about global climate change
would likely agree that the world has yet to see the
adverse effects they believe it will eventually pose.
Nonetheless, it strikes a cautionary note about all
environmental predictions to remember that this
report was published just 13 years before 130 nations
met in Kyoto, Japan, to craft a treaty aimed at dealing
with greenhouse warming, a danger that many of them
had come to view as the gravest manmade
environmental threat the world has ever faced.
With this cautionary example in mind, I have
chosen the approach of choosing a forecasting horizon
far enough in the future - a full half century - that
there is no chance of my being around to be held
accountable. I will offer some speculation about the
future of environmental regulation, as well as about the
environmental problems that regulation will confront
We can be a bit more confident with respect to the
former.
The future of environmental regulation
While environmental regulatory systems will no
doubt be buffeted by many fads and fancies over the
next 50 years, at least three enduring changes are
beginning to take shape. First, and of greatest interest
to economists, incentive based approaches to
environmental protection will grow more and more
prominent. Here I refer principally to taxes or charges
on pollution, the use of marketable permits (or related
quantity instruments) to eliminate pollution, and the
use of deposit-refund systems - all in lieu of (or
occasionally to complement) more prescriptive, often
uniform technology-based standards.
This change is farthest along in the United States,
in part because we have always relied to a greater
extent than most other countries on markets. Today in
the U.S. we have taxes on emissions of ozone-depleting
chlorofluorocarbons, marketable permits sharply
limiting emissions of sulfur dioxide from coal-fired
power plants, and municipalities levying waste disposal
charges on households based on the number or weight
ofgarbage bags set out at curbside.
Moreover, such incentive-based systems are likely
to be the future of environmental policy everywhere.
No discussion of international policy regarding global
climate change and what to do about emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is
©IGPA ^^ The Environmental Council
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complete without a lively argument about whether this
policy ought to be pursued via carbon taxes or through
a system of marketable permits. Not a single serious
proposal to control greenhouse gases has been
advanced in international forums that is predicated
principally on governments specifying "approved"
production technologies or mandating the
characteristics of consumer durable goods or other
products.
This is a remarkable change. It is now more than
30 years since Allen Kneese and his colleagues at
Resources for the Future, as well as a number of
university-based researchers, began making the case
for incentive-based approaches to environmental
protection. "A license to pollute," huffed legislators and
their staffs - virtually all ofwhom were trained in law
but few ofwhom had been exposed to the case for
market approaches to environmental protection, as
most law students are today. It would be an
exaggeration to report the death of the command-and-
control era. Indeed, in both Europe and the U.S. there
is still opposition to more flexible policy instruments.
Nevertheless, incentive-based approaches to
environmental regulation have gained a toehold they
are unlikely to yield, and will become increasingly
common in the years ahead.
A second trend in environmental regulation that
can only be expected to accelerate relates to
requirements on firms to report publicly their
emissions to air, water and land. The first major
program along these lines was contained in the 1986
amendments to the Superfund law. It established the
Toxics Release Inventory. Under this program, an ever-
expanding list of industries must report to the
Environmental Protection Agency their annual
emissions of a comparably expanding group of
substances. These reports are made public by the
EPA, although many firms beat the EPA to the punch
and announce their emissions themselves. Information
provision requirements are beginning to be written into
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other federal statutes and also state and local
environmental laws, and are also being used in
developing countries where regulatory authorities are
weak or nonexistent.
The reason for this proliferation is simple:
experience has shown that when firms are required to
make public their emissions, they feel pressure to
reduce them, even when the levels of emissions are
perfectly legal. The Environmental Defense Fund,
arguably the most influential environmental advocacy
group in the U.S., has gone one step further It takes
the emissions
^^^^^^^^^^^i^^™ information that firms
^^
. ,
report, couples it with
.
.
.incentive-based census data and makes
approaches to it possible, via the
environmental ^'"^'^'
,
,www.scorecard.org, for
regulation have each citizen to see
gained a toehold how much of each
thev are unlikelv poUutant is dischargedui y i llK iy
in each neighborhood,
to J/ield... and also to send an e-
mail to plant managers
^^^^^^^"•^^^^ registering concern
about these emissions.
The spread of electronic communication makes it all
but inevitable that governments will require more and
more public disclosure about firms' environmental
performance (including the amount offines they may
pay for accidents or non-compliance) , their
occupational safety and health record, and perhaps
other dimensions of their operations. So long as
citizens are able to make sense of this information,
programs like this are not only democratic but also
efficiency enhancing.
A third major trend in environmental regulation will
be a partial loss of authority by central governments in
the U.S. and elsewhere. Some of this authority will be
granted to increasingly sophisticated and restive lower
levels of government. At the same time, other powers
will move upward to international organizations. There
are several reasons for this apparent paradox. The U.S.
and other Western democracies presently take almost
all of their environmental regulatory actions at the
national level. This makes sense for virtually all air and
water pollution problems, because such pollution flows
across jurisdictional boundries.
But there is no obvious reason why state
governments should not control the stringency of
regulations for solid waste landfills, for instance, or
possibly even for setting standards for drinking water
contaminants, since in these cases no obvious
interstate impact is associated with one state's
choosing a weaker standard than that of its neighbor.
Even under the current, largely national system in the
U.S., important environmental regulatory
responsibilities are delegated to the states. For
instance, even where the federal government sets
uniform national air or water quality standards, the
states are given the responsibility to monitor
compliance with the standards; the states also issue
most operating permits and bring the majority of
enforcement actions. Given the growing budgets and
sophistication of state (and in some cases even regional
or local) environmental authorities, as well as the
growing mistrust of the federal government, the future
will probably bring a
devolution ofeven more ^^^^^m^m^mt^mm
authority from the federal
government to regional,
"J|^ jg virtually
state or even local
governments.
This possibility is only
reinforced by the fact that
many of the (increasingly
minor) pollution problems
that remain in the U.S. are
best handled at the sub-
federal level. These include
air pollution associated not
inconceivable
that ambient
environmental
conditions in
the U.S.... will
not continue
to improve in
so much witii large factories the decadcS tO
come.or other stationary sources
as with the effects of the
decisions of small "^^^^^^"^^
businesses and individual
motorists. Not all states are
clamoring for tiiese added regulatory responsibilities, it
should be added. Some governors would prefer to be
told what to do by tiie federal EPA rather than be
forced to face difficult tradeoffs between
environmental quality and convenience or economic
growth. But if the effects are principally local, that is
exactly where the buck ought to stop.
Even as a number of environmental issues are
debated at tiie state and local level, public awareness is
rising that certain environmental problems such as
climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, the
overexploitation offish stocks and the loss of
biodiversity due to habitat disruption require
coordinated international action if they are to be
addressed successfully Moreover, international ti-ade
negotiations can be expected to revolve increasingly
around environmental issues, as occurred in the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Pressures will
increase for harmonization of regulatory regimes,
especially those of the Western industrial democracies.
Very difficult issues will remain. Developing
countiies generally will and should resist adopting the
same standards that prevail in tiie developed countries.
For environmental problems that are more or less
confined within one nation's borders, it makes sense to
allow each country to tailor its regulations to local
economic circumstances and tastes. As countiies' per-
Policy Forum 3
capita incomes increase, so too will their demand for
environmental quality.
Among the wealthier countries, we can expect to
see bitter disputes over environmental issues. This will
be because ofgenuine differences in tradeoffs
between economic growth and individual freedoms on
the one hand, and environmental protection on the
otiier, and also because environmental protection can
easily verge on environmental protectionism. For
instance, European cattie growers have successfully
protected tiiemselves against beef imported fi-om the
U.S. by arguing that it contains hormones that,
although lawful in tiie U.S., pose healtii risks that
Europeans are unwilling to bear. Similar cases will occur
with increasing fi-equency as businesses under the
threat of foreign competition, including some in the
U.S., seek protection under the guise of environmental
concerns.
The environment of the future
It is virtually inconceivable that ambient
environmental conditions in the U.S., as well as in most
other western democracies, will not continue to
improve in the decades to come. The past record has
been most pronounced in the U.S. with respect to air
quality, which is significantiy, better in virtually every
U.S. city along most every dimension. Water quality
has improved substantially in most places, and both
solid and hazardous wastes are being handled and
disposed of with much greater care than in the past.
Generally speaking, the experience of the
industrialized countries mirrors that of the U.S.
Tliis favorable environmental experience in
developed economies represents a triumph of
technology - some required by regulation, some the
result of market forces. In effect, the ratio of pollution
per unit of Gross Domestic Product has fallen fast
enough in the developed worid to offset the increases
in both population and GDP per capita. This fa-end will
continue in the wealthier countiies, for several reasons.
First, tiiere is little doubt that as incomes increase,
people will demand an increasingly cleaner
environment. Second, natural gas is the fuel of choice
for virtually all new electricity generation capacity in
many places, and over the next 50 years or so natural
gas will gradually replace coal for much of the baseload
generation that coal now provides. Since coal accounts
for more than half of all electiicity generated in tiie
U.S., tills shift will have positive effects on ambient air
quality, and will reduce emissions of carbon dioxide as
well. Nuclear power is quite atfractive on the grounds
of reducing air pollution as well, though it faces
technological problems of its own regarding the
disposal of radioactive wastes, and political opposition.
Finally, it appears tiiat cars, trucks and buses -
which become less and less polluting witii each passing
year - before too long will not be powered by the
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intrinsically dirty internal combustion engine, but
rather by fuel cells that extract hydrogen from gasoline
or methanol and eventually from even cleaner sources.
Since these "mobile sources," as motor vehicles are
called, are increasingly the major contributors to the
urban air pollution problems that remain, this change
bodes well for the future.
Environmental prospects are less bright in the
developing world. First, most of the three billion or so
new inhabitants of the earth during the next 50 years
will be born and live in the developing world. (In fact, in
Japan and parts ofWestern Europe, populations will fall
unless the decline in fertility rates is reversed, or
unless immigration increases considerably.) Second,
inhabitants of the developing world will continue to
migrate to already crowded mega-cities. They wUl want
cars and electricity It is hard to see how China, hidia
and other rapidly growing countries will meet their
needs for electrification without making use of their
vast coal reserves, although local air pollution problems
have become so serious in China that coal use there
has dropped in the last two years. While these
developing countries, too, will one day see cars
powered by fuel cells, it seems more likely in the next
few decades that they will rely on old, gasoline-
powered internal combustion vehicles. Absent major
policy initiatives, this spells frouble for air quality in
developing countries. The press of more and more
people into cities will also overwhelm water supply and
sewage treatment systems where such systems exist.
These ingredients may appear a recipe for
environmental catastrophe, but there is reason to
believe that even these serious problems will be
overcome. After all, it was only 30 years ago in the U.S.
that the Cuyahoga River caught fire and that air
pollution occasionally got so bad that motorists were
forced to turn their headlights on during the day to see
and be seen. The rise in living standards in the U.S.
increased the demand for environmental quality to the
point that people preferred to take additional
increments in the quality of life in the form of a better
environment, rather than a fatter paycheck. There is
growing evidence that this pattern also holds true in
developing countries; that is, environmental quality
may deteriorate during a period in which developing
countries begin to industrialize, but at some point this
deterioration is stopped and reversed as incomes rise.
The principal environmental challenge for the
developed world today is to help the developing
countries increase their standards of living in ways that
help them skirt, to as great an extent as possible, the
pollution-intensive period through which the developed
countries passed.
Perhaps the greatest immediate concerns involve
the threat of environmental damage that may be
essentially irreversible. Degradation of air or water
quality can eventually be reversed. However, we cannot
resuscitate a species once driven to extinction or
regrow (in any meaningful time scale) a redwood or
other old growth forest lost to logging or urban growth.
While the forested areas of the U.S. and a number of
other western democracies are greater than they were
a century ago, forests
^^^^,^1^^,^^^^^^ are being lost at a rapid
''Axru-i 4-1-
clip in many developing
Wnile the countries. This need not
forested areas be the case. Analysts
of the U.S. and ^'^' 'fT""^.*!;^^.agricultural productivity
a number of could be lifted around
other western the world to the average
democracies ^"^"^ "^'"^"^'^ "•^;;°^"
grower, even a world
are greater inhabited by ten billion
than they were people would need only
a rpntiirv pcrn half as much acreage ince tu y ago,
agricultural production.
forests are lliis would greatly
being lost at a reduce pressure to
raniH rlin in convert forested areas top a cup in
subsistence agriculture.
many similarly, recent
developing increases in forest
rni 1n triAC " Productivity could makecuuiuiiess.
it possible to meet the
^i^HM^^H^^^^H^^ needs for wood ofeven a
much more populous
world while increasing,
not decreasing forested acreage. These improvements
will not happen by themselves, however. Tlie
developed world could play a key role in the next 50
years by helping the developing world take advantage
of these more productive agricultural and tree growing
technologies, though attitudes in the U.S., at least,
toward foreign assistance do not suggest that such
help will soon be forthcoming.
After faulting others for underestimating the
importance of climate change, it would be foolish to
make the same mistake here. Indeed, it is likely to be
the paramount environmental issue of the next half-
century. This is not because it cries out for immediate
and sfrong actions. In fact, the many uncertainties
about causes and effects, coupled with the significant
time lag involved in attempting to slow the
accumulation ofgreenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
point to the desirability of a more gradual approach
than that agreed to in Kyoto. It would be prudent for
the U.S. to begin now the task of reducing the rate of
growth of its emissions ofcarbon dioxide, ideally
through gradually increasing taxes on the carbon
content of fossil fuels (or marketable emission limits)
,
coupled with offsetting reductions in other taxes on
labor and capital. Ultimately, of course, China, India and
other rapidly developing countries must also act to slow
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their emissions growth. But it would be both futile and
unfair to ask them to begin doing so until the U.S. and
other western industrial democracies have shown the
way.
Other new technologies
Will the new information and communications
technologies of the 21st century, as well as other
technological and biomedical innovations, make it
possible to sidestep these environmental problems?
After all, genetically modified organisms will make it
possible to increase agricultural and forest productivity,
although cultural objections may limit the extent to
which their potential is realized. Still other such
organisms will facilitate the cleanup of soil and
groundwater contamination. An economy increasingly
based on services and information seems like it should
be a cleaner economy than one focused on heavy
manufacturing.
On the other side, however, not all technological
advances will necessarily be environmentally friendly.
As we learn much, much more about the genetic
causes of death and disease, it would be surprising if
lifespans did not continue to increase. This will mean
that more goods and services
will be consumed. Even
though the Internet may ^^'^^^^^^^^"
change how businesses and
individuals communicate with
one another, we'll all still need
"stiiff." This stuff may be
delivered to us as a follow-up
to electronic commerce, but
we'll probably make another
trip, or do something else that
consumes resources, using
the time that was saved in
shopping. In fact, if electronic
commerce makes it easier to
do ourjobs from remote
locations, it may well promote
"sprawl" - another bete noire
of environmentalists.
The technological
wonders of today, and others
as yet unimagined, will no
^^^^^^^^^^^~
doubt change to some extent
what we eat (and how it is grown) , how longwe live,
and what we do with our spare time. But heretical as it
may sound, these changes will probably fall short of
transforming life in 2050 in a way that would make it
unrecognizable to people today. For example, life 50
years ago was in many respects not at all unlike life
today Our fathers (and a few mothers) drove to work,
generally by themselves, as most of us do today; in
fact, many more ofthem used public transportation
than today. They worked in offices, factories, stores, or
"(In 2050)
the face of
environmental
problems, as
well as the
policies we
use to
address
them, will
look very
much the
same as they
do today."
on farms that - while much more labor and pollution
intensive than today - aren't all that different from
those of today. They ate and recreated in ways that had
less variety and choice, but weren't fundamentally
different from how we eat and recreate today. The best
guess we can make about the world of 2050 is that
although we would be amazed by many of its elements,
we will recognize the underlying patterns easily
enough.
Thus, people will still use energy, particularly for
electricity generation and personal transport. In the
developing countries, the demands for economic
growth will lead to sharply rising demands for energy,
to stresses on water resources, and to pressures for
clearing land, which will create tensions with
environmental objectives. The face of environmental
problems, as well as the policies we use to address
them, will look very much the same as they do today.
Paul R. Portney is President and Senior Fellow,
Resources for the Future, Washington D.C.
This article was originally published in the Journal
ofEconomic Perspectives - Volume 14, Number 1 -
Winter 2000 - Pages 199-206. It is reprinted here,
with slight modification, by permission ofthe author
and the American Economic Association.
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Finding "Hope" for cliildren and seniors
By Brenda Krause Eheart
and David Hopping
Editor's Note: This issue ofPolicy Forum departs
from the usual focus of the series. Instead ofproviding
independent commentary on an issue ofpublic policy, it
describes and explains the rationale for an innovative,
widely-praised foster-care and adoption program that is
administered by Generations ofHope, a unit of the
Institute ofGovernment and Public Affairs. Professor
Brenda Krause Eheart is Director of Generations of
Hope. David Hopping is a sociologist who has been
evaluating the impact of the Generations ofHope
program and translating the results of that evaluation
into policy options.
In May of 1994 an innovative foster/adoption
program was launched in a small town in central Illinois.
Utilizing housing on a former Air Force base,
Generations of Hope (then called Hope for the
Children) established a neighborhood composed of
senior citizens, foster-adoptive families, and a small
staff. Hope's purpose is to assist in the adoption of
children seemingly trapped in the foster-care system, to
support them throughout their childhood, and to
provide seniors with a new, useful chapter in their lives.
Hope, as a partner with the University of Illinois'
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, offers
.
policymakers a new model for strategies dealing with
retirement and foster care.
Hope Meadows
Generations of Hope is a not-for-profit corporation
and child welfare agency, and Hope Meadows is its first
program site. Hope Meadows is a contained, "inter-
generational," planned community where foster and
adoptive families, children, and senior citizens live
together and care for one another It was designed to
provide a model of foster care and adoption that protects
children, offers permanency, and cultivates personal and
social development and as a response to the challenge of
applying whatwe already know—that nurturing families
and caring communities are necessary for healthy child
development.
With a $1 million grant from the state of Dlinois, Hope
purchased a 22-acre housing subdivision that once had
been part of the base housing complex at the now-closed
Chanute Air Force Base. Twelve duplexes were
converted into single-family homes, and three were
renovated for administrative and community use. Ten
four-plexes were renovated and made into 40 apartments
for seniors. With its tree-lined streets that meander in
typical suburban fashion, the neighborhood is virtually
indistinguishable from the surrounding housing. Overall
the appearance is that of a semi-rural, working-class
environment where kids walk to public schools, ride
bicycles and run freely between and around the houses,
moving from one large open green space to the next.
At the core of Hope's intergenerational neighborhood
are the comprehensive assessment and evaluation of
children, the provision of necessary services to those
children, the adoption of those children by parents
within the neighborhood, and the ongoing support for
the neighborhood's families. That support includes
weekly parent training, on-site therapy and counseling
for children and families, and the volunteer help of
Hope's seniors.
Perhaps the most striking component of Hope's
neighborhood is this cadre of senior volunteers. Seniors
live in the neighborhood and receive below-market-rate
rent in return for six hours a week of volunteer work
which may include tutoring, playing games, child care,
guarding school crossings, playground supervision, or
numerous other jobs. A principle contribution, however,
^} IGFAUnwersityojyflUinois
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lies in simply becoming a part of the lives of the children
— just being there, lending an ear, and sharing their
wisdom and insight as neighbors and honorary
grandparents.
A final component of the program at Hope is
monetary support for parents in exchange for a life-long
commitment to the children who share their lives. Hope
families receive a large six-to-seven bedroom home rent-
free and approximately $19,000 a year so that one
parent can stay at home and be a full-time mom or dad,
adopting and raising up to four children from the foster
care system.
The young and the old
It is not news that changes need to be made in the
way we support both the children caught in the
quagmire of child welfare and seniors living lonely lives
on limited incomes. The kind of children who come to
Hope have been describedas "discarded" or
"disposable." These are the children who are scarred
by abuse and neglect (both by parents and by the foster-
care system) and who are thus not easily adopted
through traditional avenues. They tend to be older, to be
minorities, to be part of a sibling group, to have severe
behavior and emotional problems, and to have been
born to parents unable or unwilling to perform the task
of parenting. As of September 30, 1999, a record
581,000 children in the United States were reported to
be in foster care. At least 127,000 of these children were
waiting to be adopted.
The problems facing the child-welfare system show
little sign of abating. As one researcher enumerated
them recently in an argument for privatizing the whole
system, they include "children staying in foster care too
long, children being shuffled through several foster
homes, abuse in foster homes, children available for
adoption who remain in foster care too long, caseworker
burnout, large caseloads, high turnover, poor invest-
igations, incomplete paperwork, and lost files and data."
Whatever the merits of privatization, it is clear that the
child-welfare system is not meeting the needs of these
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'discarded' or
'disposable.'"
vulnerable children. Agencies alone cannot keep
children safe and happy; they must reach out to families
and communities to solve the child-welfare crisis.
The Hope program focuses on foster children, ages
1 1 and younger, who are unlikely ever to return home
from state care. Approximately two-thirds of the
children who come to
Hope are more than 15
months old and have ^^^^^^^^^^""^^^^
spent more than halfof
^ ^
their lives mio^ier The kind of
care, fliese children
children who
are representative of
the thousands whose COme to Hope
time in care exceeds have been
the guidelines set by described aS
the federal 1997
Adoption and Safe
Families Act, which
mandates that a child
should not spend more w^^^^^^mm^^^^^^^m
than 15 of 22
consecutive months in
state care without finding permanency.
Seventy-five children referred by the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services have
moved to Hope since September 1994. Counting current
pre-adoptive placements, 90 percent of these children
have achieved permanency. This is significantly higher
than what the state has been able to accomplish.
Between 1995 and 1999, the rate of adoption at Hope
was more than three times higher than the annual
average for the state as a whole.
Currently, 31 foster children are living at Hope
Meadows, joining 21 birth and adopted children who
were already a part of Hope families. Upon arrival these
31 foster children ranged from just days old to 13 years
of age; two-thirds were older than five. Eighteen of
these children have siblings living at Hope. Seventy-two
percent are Afi-ican Americans. Well over a quarter had
been sexually abused, came with serious medical
problems or were drug exposed at birth. Thirty-five
percent had severe behavior and emotional problems.
These children came from dysfunctional families.
One-third of the mothers were seriously develop-
mentally delayed and nearly two-thirds were mentally ill.
Seventy-eight percent of the mothers were teens when
they had their first child, and 83 percent were drug or
alcohol abusers. About half of the birth mothers were
allegedly abused as children. Two-thirds of the birth
fathers had never been involved in their child's life and
one-half of the fathers are not even mentioned in their
child's case records.
Hope recognizes that adoption for most of these
children will involve risks and difficulties and require
continuing support. However, the manner in which
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these needs and supports are perceived and provided
for at Hope is, in many ways, new. TTie program's
success suggests that a radical departure from business
as usual is needed in the foster-care and child-welfare
systems.
The need for change
The need for radical change is no less evident when
considering how to meet the needs of the rapidly
increasing number of senior citizens. The 2000 census
counted 41.3 million persons age 62 and older in the
United States, and 1.8 million age 62 and older in Illinois.
Since 1900 the proportion of individuals in later life has
tripled, producing an end result that, as researcher Marc
Freedman notes, is truly staggering: "Half of all the
people who have ever lived to age 65 are currently
alive." TTiis dramatic trend creates challenges and
opportunities that cannot be ignored.
Most older people face major life transitions such as
the death of a spouse, the onset of physical disabilities,
leaving one's job, and caring for younger and older family
members. TTiese transitions represent key emotional
turning points, may pose major economic challenges,
and can create social dislocations leading to depression,
isolation and illness.
"Social connectedness," writes Robert Putnam, "is one
of the most powerful determinants of our well-being."
Many older Americans have two very special gifts: a
surplus of unstructured time and vast experience. But in
order to begin a new, active and involved chapter in life,
and to avoid what can be a jarring transition into
retirement, new institutions and opportunities for
service will have to be created. Seniors need to be able
to make a genuine contribution to society while
benefiting in the process. We need to look past the
dominant attitude of seeing seniors as a potentially
unsupportable burden. TTiey should be viewed as an
untapped national resource.
In contemplating new models of retirement, however,
it is easy to overlook the approximately one-third of
seniors who may be the most vulnerable. These are the
seniors who are not poor by federal standards, like
many of the seniors living at Hope, they have worked
hard all of their lives but come to their later years
without the security of savings, an adequate pension, or
a home that is paid for. Too often this segment of the
population (retired Catholic school teachers, bus drivers,
self-employed owners of small businesses, etc.) is
sidelined from mainstream America.
The mean age of Hope seniors is 65. Currently the 59
seniors living at Hope Meadows are renting 39 apart-
ments. The average annual income per household is
$12,389, with a slight majority of the households having
at least one senior employed (mostly part-time)
.
Together they average a total of 1,400 volunteer hours
per month, about one-third more hours than are
required by Hope.
Connecting young and old
At Hope Meadows, there is a close connection
between the quality of life for the young and the old.
TTiis connection can
make important
contributions to the well ^^^am^^^^m^^mmm
being of both children
and seniors. Research -
,
has shown how care for The problem
the young and for the old •
^ ^^^^ children
and the
elderly are
generally
regarded as
being in
competition
for scarce
public
resources."
is intimately connected,
and how communities
that are safe, supportive,
and manageable for the
old are also good for
children. And as one
researcher points out,
fostering the well-being
of children offers the
most urgent and
promising opportunities
for revolutionizing
retirement.
The problem is that
children and the elderly b^^^h^^^h^h^^hh
are generally regarded
as being in competition
for scarce public resources. Tough decisions seem to be
demanded regarding provision for their prospective
needs. What once might have constituted a solution (the
mutual care ofyoung and old) is now divided neatly into
two problems. And these become the province of a
rapidly-growing service economy that still never quite
manages to cover the ever-expanding needs.
At Hope, children previously caught in the foster-care
system, and seniors previously sidelined from
mainstream America, live side by side as friends and
neighbors. This model offers policymakers new ideas
for dealing with the problems faced by children and
seniors.
Recommendations
Our view of children who enter state care must
change. Rather than viewmg them as wards-to-be-
managed, where the focus is on finding and repairing
deficits, these children should be seen as ordinary kids
with the same need for family and community that our
own biological children have. When a decision is made
about a foster child, we should ask ourselves, "Is this
what I would want for my own child?" Likewise, our
ageist view of seniors as being weak, passive, and
useless needs to change.
4 Finding "Hope" for children and seniors
Second, neighborhood-based child-welfare initiatives
need to be encouraged. Agency-based services alone
cannot protect children, nor help them form meaningful
relationships. New partnerships need to be formed with
families and neighborhoods where much of the work of
caring and decisionmaking is left to the residents, not
the "professionals." It may even be necessary, as with
Hope, to develop new neighborhoods where the
common purpose is caring for the children.
Third, it is imperative that we recognize that adoption,
by itself, is not a magic bullet for foster children. The
older the children are, usually, the greater their
problems. To best promote positive outcomes, ongoing
post-adoption programs that focus on support for the
entire family are necessary.
Fourth, we must begin to inject an intergenerational
vision into public policy. Instead of having the old and the
young compete for scarce dollars, we need to look at
funding holistically. We need to ask how we can fund
programs that help children help seniors, help seniors
meet the needs of families, and help families meet the
needs of children and seniors. The result will be that all
benefit, and communities will become stronger.
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By Bradley Gray
Medicaid, tlie government-funded health insurance
program for low-income people, covers about 40 percent
of all women of childbearing age and pays for about one-
third of all deliveries. In general, Medicaid physician
fees, set by the states, are substantially lower than those
paid by private insurance plans and by Medicare, the
national health program for the elderly—for which fees
are set by the federal government. In Illinois, for
example, Medicaid fees are about half of those paid by
Medicare for comparable services.
In view of these low fees, studies show, many private
physicians are reluctant to accept Medicaid patients.
Physicians may also provide inferior care to such
patients. What is the significance of these low fees, then,
in the case of prenatal care? Do low Medicaid fees
translate into negative birth outcomes—in particular,
low-birth-weight babies—for Medicaid-insured women?
Considering the health consequences and economic
costs of low-weight births, is there a strong case for
substantial increases in Medicaid fees for prenatal care?
The impact of low fees
Tliis article describes the findings of a new study by
the author, as well as other recent research, that
suggest that the low fees paid by Medicaid for physician
services may have a negative impact on access to
prenatal care and increase the chances that children
born to Medicaid-insured mothers will suffer from low-
birth-weight (LBW)
.
A 1995 study examined the link between Medicaid
fees and birth outcomes and reports that differences
among states and over time in Medicaid fees paid for
obstetrical services, relative to private fees for such
services, have important effects on state-level infant
mortality rates. It showed that a doubling of the relative
Medicaid fee for obstetrical services is associated with a
5 percent to 9 percent decrease in state infant mortality
rates. This study, although suggestive of a link between
fees and the risk ofbad birth outcomes, examines infant
mortality for all women. What conclusions can be drawn
about Medicaid-insured women? Does the negative
relationship between fees and infant mortality rates also
carry over to other issues of infant health, such as low
birth weight?
Low birth weight has been associated with high
neonatal costs and generally poorer lifetime health. In
1988 it was estimated that the additional health care
costs as well as childcare and educational costs
associated with low birth weight, at nearly $16,000 per
child, amounted to $5.4 billion.
A significant factor in low birth weight is access to
services. Several academic studies suggest that low
Medicaid fees for physician services result in reduced
use of primary preventative care. For example, one
study discovered that the number of visits to primary
care physicians is quite sensitive to relative Medicaid
physician fees and that low Medicaid fees are associated
with increased use of expensive emergency room
services. Another investigation reports that more
generous Medicaid fees lead to greater access to care
for children as measured by number of physician office
visits. A study that looked at physician fee changes from
1988 to 1991 in Washington State reports that higher
fees were associated with improved access to prenatal
services among at-risk populations. Also linked to higher
fees were access to obstetricians, the number and
length of prenatal visits, and patients' receipt of
beneficial ser%aces during such visits.
Study methodology
The new study described here analyzes data from a
1988 nationally representative survey of pregnant
women, the National Maternal and Infant Health Survey
(NMIHS) , to examine the effects of Medicaid fees on
first-trimester prenatal visits and birth weight. Roughly
^} IGFAUmversityojjfIllinois
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4,000 Medicaid-insured women and 7,000 non-Medicaid-
insured women were sent a detailed questionnaire
regarding their behavior during and after pregnancy as
well as their socioeconomic status and use of prenatal
services. Other information obtained in the survey
describes the newborn's health.
The following variables were used in the study:
• Low birth weight (LBW, less than 2.5 kilograms)
and very low birth weight (VLBW, less than 1.5
kilograms) as the measures of birth outcome. As noted
earlier, LBW and VLBW are important measures for
determining policy in this area, because they predict not
Figure 1. Risk of negative birth outcomes by
Medicaid versus Non-Medicaid status
• The Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratio for obstetrical
services as the fee measure. Medicaid fees are set by
the states, whereas Medicare fees are set at the federal
level but vary across states to reflect the typical cost of
providing services.
• The mother's income. In addition to the overall
analysis, the study examines the relationship between
Medicaid fees and the risk of low birth weight separately
for very low-income women Oess than $5,000 per year)
.
One strategy for estimating the relationship between
Medicaid fees and the risk ofLBW is to look simply at
the relationship between fees and birth outcomes. The
problem with this
approach, however, is that
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only infant death but also the use of expensive neonatal
intensive care and the lifetime health of the newborn.
• Patient use of a first-trimester prenatal visit as the
measure of access to care. Again, this measure is
important to policy because prenatal visits during the
first trimester are known to be important to both
detecting and preventing problems that may occur later
in the pregnancy and to advising expectant mothers on
beneficial and hazardous behaviors.
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the Medicaid fee-setting
strategies of the states
might introduce
complications into the
estimation of the impact of
fees on outcomes. For
example, suppose that
some states have poor
birth outcomes because of
other factors, such as
polluted water, and that
they institute above-
average Medicaid fees in
response. To the extent
this occurs, higher
Medicaid fees will appear
to produce worse results
than lower fees. To avoid
this misleading result, the
study looks at the effects of state Medicaid fees on the
difference in risk ofLBW between Medicaid-insured
women and non-Medicaid-insured women in each state.
In effect, the non-Medicaid-insured women are used as a
control group to isolate the effect of Medicaid fees on
LBW. The same strategy is used to estimate the
relationship between Medicaid fees and use of a first-
trimester prenatal visit.
Results and conclusions
Are babies born to Medicaid-insured women healthy?
No, notwhen compared with those born to women not
insured by Medicaid. Figure 1 reveals that during the
one-year study period (1988) ,2.02 percent of births
among Medicaid-insured women were associated with
very low birth weight, slightly more than double the
0.98 percent ofVLBW births for non-Medicaid-insured
women. Similarly, 10.84 percent of births among
Medicaid-insured women were of low birth weight, as
compared with 5.73 percent of births for non-Medicaid-
insured women. A similar pattern emerges across
income groups. For example, 10.92 percent ofwomen in
the low-income group had a low-birth-weight birth as
compared with 6.64 percent in the high-income group.
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Medicaid-insured women also were 30 percent less
likely to have a first-trimester prenatal visit than non-
Medicaid-insured women.
TTiese mean comparisons indicate that the potential
to improve birth outcomes among Medicaid-insured
Figure 2. Risk of negative birth
outcomes before and after doubling of
Medicaid fee
0)
o
0.
Very Low Birth Weight Low Birth Weight
I Medicaid-Insured H IVIedicaid-lnsured after doubling fee
women is significant. But can higher Medicaid fees help
bridge the gap between potential and reality? The results
of the empirical analysis suggest that higher Medicaid
physician fees may be part of the answer for reaching
this potential. For example, study results indicate that
being Medicaid-insured and giving birth in a state where
Medicaid fees are 10 percent above average are
independently associated with a reduction of about 7
percent in the difference between Medicaid- and non-
Medicaid-insured women with respect to LBW and
VLBW outcomes. In a comparison of Medicaid-insured
women with high-income women, this reduction grows
to one-third of the gap forVLBW and just over 15
percent for LBW.
To gauge the effects of substantial fee increases, the
study simulates the results on birth outcomes of
doubling the Medicaid fee ratio. The result is a decrease
in VLBW among Medicaid-insured women of nearly 45
percent, from more than 1 in 50 to just more than 1 in
100, and a decrease in the LBW from more than 1 in 10
to just over 1 in 20 (Figure 2) . When the data from the
period covered in this analysis are applied, this fee
increase raises the Medicaid fee to about the same level
as that of the comparable privately paid insurance fee.
The study results also suggest that a statistically
significant positive association exists between increased
Medicaid fee levels and the use of a first-trimester
prenatal visit by women in the Medicaid-insured group.
For first-trimester visits, a 10 percent increase in fees
results in a statistically significant 1 percent increase in
the use of first-trimester prenatal visits for Medicaid-
insured women or a nearly 5 percent reduction in the
gap between Medicaid-insured and non-Medicaid-insured
women in the use of these early visits.
Decreasing low- and very-low-birth-
weight births, as well as increasing
access to early prenatal care for poor
women, is a worthy goal, but what does
it cost? Once the cost savings associated
with the estimated reduction in the
number ofLBW births are factored in,
the cost of the fee increase likely falls
somewhere between revenue neutral
and, at most, about $15,000 per LBW
birth avoided. Supporting the view that
this fee increase would be costless,
another study found that state-level
hikes in similar Medicaid fees resulted in
no increases in total Medicaid health
care expenditures.
But how relevant are estimates that
are based on data more than 10 years
old? Unfortunately, they are very
relevant. Although Medicaid fees did
increase in 1992 (about 20 percent, but
still significandy lower than private fees)
,
a recent "Health Affairs" article reports
that, as of 1998, Medicaid fees for obstetrical services
still, on average, lag far behind private sector rates and
have fallen in real terms since 1992. The evidence of this
study suggests that low Medicaid fees for prenatal care
are having a high cost in infant health and mortality.
Bradley Gray is an assistant professor ofHealth Policy
and Administration at the University ofIllinois at
Chicago and with the Institute ofGovernment and Public
Affairs.
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